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THE DEATH OF THE RULE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES, OR THE RAP HAS
NO FRIENDS—AN ESSAY
Joel C. Dobris*
Editors’ Synopsis:  This Article analyzes the Rule Against Perpetuities,
which limits “dead hand” contro l of property to a reasonable period of
time and chronicles its decline in recent years as pu blic interest in
creating perpetuities has increased.  The author details society’s
prevailing attitudes towards aggregations of wealth in trusts that
facilitate the creation of perpetuities and undermine the Rule’s legitimacy
in modern law.
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1 As an essay, and a piece of professional literature, many statements in this paper are
based on observation, experience, intuition, and situation.  The finding of empirical proof,
or disproof, must be the task of others.
2 To simplify, the Rule Against Perpetuities does not exist, to one degree or another,
in the following jurisdictions, among others: Alaska, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland,
Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.  See ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.050 (a) (3)
(Michie 2000) (repealed 2000); 25 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503(a) (2000) (amended
2000); IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (Michie 2000); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/2-6 (1993 & Supp.
2000); MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS § 11-102 (e) (Supp. 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2131.09 (Anderson 1998 & Supp. 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-38 (1956 & Supp.
1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 43-5-1, 43-5-8 (Michie 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.16
(West 1981 & Supp. 1999).  South Dakota is discussed in Thomas H. Foye, Using South
Dakota Law for Perpetual Trusts, PROB. & PROP., Jan./Feb. 1998, at 17. 
3 The case for the Rule Against Perpetuities can be found in many places, including
JOEL C. DOBRIS & STEWART E. STERK, RITCHIE, ALFORD & EFFLAND’S ESTATES AND
TRUSTS 745-48 (9th ed. 1998).  See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Significant Trends in the Trust
Law of the United States, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 531, 535 (1999); Ira Mark Bloom,
The GST Tail is Killing the Rule Against Perpetuities, TAX NOTES, Apr. 24, 2000, at 569.
4 To simplify, the trusts and estates law reform establishment assumes that the
movement to abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities is unseemly and should be dismissed.
See Halbach, supra note 3, at 535; Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property,
108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1180 (1999).  (Professor Heller is not yet a member of the Trusts and
Estates Establishment.)  But cf. Susan F. French, Perpetuities: Three Essays in Honor of My
Father, 65 WASH. L. REV. 323, 348 (1990).  (Professor French is currently a member of the
Trusts and Estates Establishment.)  See also T.P. Gallanis, The Rule Against Perpetuities
and the Law Commission’s Flawed Philosophy, 59 CAMBRIDGE  L.J. 284 (2000) (suggesting
that the experience of Canada and the United States undermines the economic rationale of
the Rule Against Perpetuities and that the Law Commission should consider recommending
the Rule’s abolition); Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the
Bottom?  85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035 (2000) (tracing the rise of the asset protection trust and
analyzing the effects of interstate competition on trust laws).  Abolition is discussed in G.
Graham Waite, Let’s Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities, 21 REAL EST. L.J. 93 (1992).
FOREWORD
This is an essay.1  It is not an empirical study or a theory.  It asks and
answers an interesting question. 
I.  INTRODUCTION
We are in a moment in time where parts of the body politic and
various legislatures are willing to allow perpetual trusts to exist unmolested
and undenounced.2  Except for a few law professors,3 tax bureaucrats, and
even fewer reform-minded trusts and estates practitioners,4 society does not
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5 To simplify, the Rule Against Perpetuities requires that interests vest, or fail to vest,
within a period of a life or lives in being, plus 21 years.  See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (Roland Gray ed., 4th ed. 1942).  Historically, the Rule
Against Perpetuities represented a compromise between rich folks who wanted to tie up
their property, and their heirs, forever, and those heirs (and society) who wanted the
property outright, immediately.  A compromise was struck.  Society, through its courts,
determined that one could tie up one’s property for a  reasonable period of time, but if that
reasonable period was exceeded then the arrangement was void from the beginning.
“Reasonable” came to be defined as a life or lives in being, plus 21 years.  See The Duke of
Norfolk’s Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682); Mary Louise Fellows, Testing
Perpetuity Reforms: A Study of Perpetuity Cases 1984-89, 25 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
597, 602 (1991).  Professors Scott, Fratcher, and Ascher deal with the Rule Against
Perpetuities in 4A AUSTIN W. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 348 (William F. Fratcher ed.,
4th ed. 1987 & Mark L. Ascher ed., Supp. 1998).
6 A look at some Van Dyck portraits might change some minds.   That Van Dyck
specialized in portraying aristocrats is noted by Souren Melikan, The Patrician Genius of
Van Dyck, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 11-12, 1999, at 7; ROBIN BLAKE, ANTHONY VAN
DYCK, 1599-1641: A LIFE (1999).  Better a viscount than a baron.  Let me attempt to prove,
dear reader, that you do not care. The English Channel Island of Sark, simply put, is
governed by feudal law.  Major players on Sark are the two Barclay brothers who own,
among other things, the Ritz Hotel in London and The Scotsman newspaper (Scotland’s
leading daily).  They have a $100 million summer place on Sark that was subject to
primogeniture.  Primogeniture is bad for the Barclays, who want their daughters to have
access to the summer place and who have successfully forced the Seigneur of Sark and its
tiny legislature of landowners to abolish primogeniture.  Does any of this bother you or
inspire a desire for reform?  I hazard a guess: “No.”  See Rachel Sylvester, Sark Forced to
Let Daughters Inherit, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH Nov. 17, 1999, at 1.  See also Angela M.
Vallario, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Rule Against Perpetuities, 25 J. LEGIS. 141 (1999)
(critically analyzing the weakening of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities in the
United States).
seem to care anymore about perpetuities,5 dynasties, dynastic property, and
“baronies.”6  Why?  It is not clear if today’s equivalents of the landed
gentry of yesteryear are merely meeting less resistance, if the debate (if
there even is one) is asymmetrical, or if the number of folks who want
perpetuities is larger than before.  Or, it actually may be that the Rule
Against Perpetuities has outlived its usefulness.
Are economic elites seizing a prosperous moment in time to assure
their primacy forever?  Rich folks always push for advantage, but at the
moment no one is pushing back in the perpetuities arena.  Most plain folks
see no danger.  Why are there so few complaints?  That is the point of this
essay.
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7 See John K. Eason, Home From the Islands: Domestic Asset Protection Trust
Alternatives Impact Traditional Estate and Gift Tax Planning Considerations, 52 FLA. L.
REV. 41, 54 (2000).   See also Randall J. Gingiss, Putting a Stop to “Asset Protection”
Trusts, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 987 (1999) (discussing remedies available to set such trusts
aside).
8 See Sterk, supra note 4.
9 See id.
10 For a discussion of how to invest and pay out return from a perpetual trust, see
James P. Garland, A Market-Yield Spending Rule for Endowments and Trusts, FIN.
ANALYSTS J., July-Aug. 1989, at 50. An update of this article can be found at James P.
Garland, A Market Yield Spending Rule Revisited: An Update Through 1998, 2 J. PRIVATE
PORTFOLIO MGMT. 50 (1999), available at http://www.jeffreyco.com/Jim_Pubs.html.  
11 The term  “we” is used differently throughout this essay.  Sometimes it refers to the
joint venture of author and reader. Most of the time the term means that part of society
involved with (or choosing not to be involved with) the matter under consideration.  “We”
in this essay never includes every reader or every member of society.  The problem with
“we” is that of “essentialism.”   According to Professor Appiah:  
The genteel cadences of old did not survive the resulting culture wars, for the
liberationists aimed to dismantle the ethical consensus that earlier critics had
assumed: Trilling’s magisterial “we” once meant to conjure a moral community,
came to be deplored as blithe “exclusion of difference.”  “Essentialism” began as
a word for criticizing anyone who assumed that all X’s shared the same
characteristics. 
K. Anthony Appiah, Battle of the Bien-Pensant, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 27, 2000, at 42.
This excerpt might well refer to the breakdown of the trust consensus.  The pronoun “we”
as used in this Article never includes Professor Holly Doremus.
Let us talk about the form not-caring-about-perpetuities is taking.  
First and foremost, some U.S. states and foreign jurisdictions,
especially some island nations hungry for out-of-jurisdiction trust business,
have exhibited willingness to repeal the Rule Against Perpetuities.7  Who
cares if Alaska becomes the home of a number of essentially out-of-state
perpetual trusts?  Even if there is something inherently wrong with
perpetual trusts, not many Alaskans will create them.   So, the vast majority
of Alaskans are not going to care.  Perpetual Alaska trusts are an
externality imposed on other states.8  Inevitably, in an era of low taxes in a
federal system, the local bankers and lawyers organize and lobby to gain an
advantage, with no opposition from disorganized out-of-state creditors and
out-of-state banks that eventually may lose money or business.  Their most
effective weapon against lost business is enacting similar laws at home.9  
The sanctioning of perpetual trusts by some states and nations is the
most obvious form that not-caring-about-perpetuities is taking.10  We11 are
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12 This Article addresses two kinds of perpetuities, including entities that can last
“forever” and trust arrangements that are meant to last longer than the Rule.  “Forever” is
eternity that can only be described as 
the darkness beyond . . . which went on and on forever.  There was no word for
it.  Even eternity was a human idea.  Giving it a name gave it a length;
admittedly, a very long one.  But this darkness was what was left when eternity
had given up.  It was where Death lived.  Alone. 
TERRY PRATCHETT, SOUL MUSIC 303 (1995).
13 See MARION FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 40-41 (1965)
(General acts for incorporation for charitable purposes in some instances preceded
corporations for business purposes.  For instance, in New York an act allowing incorpora-
tion for religious purposes was passed in 1784; the first act permitting general incorporation
for business purposes was not passed until 1811.); Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century
Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129,
138-63 (1985).  
14 See In re Mayo, 105 N.W.2d 900 (Minn. 1960).  The point is picaresquely made:
“[B]ut it would come to nothing he knew. . . .  [C]ompanies were an invention of the devil.
A few speculators got them up and made money themselves out of land and contracts, while
the shareholders they had hoodwinked starved. There’s something in that, I conceded to this
bigoted old conservative . . . .”  ERSKINE CHILDERS, THE RIDDLE OF THE SANDS 223 (1903),
quoted in Joel C. Dobris, Why Trustee Investors Often Prefer Dividends to Capital Gain
and Debt Investments to Equity—A Daunting Principal and Income Problem, 32 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 255, 297 n.169 (1997).
15 See CHILDERS, supra note 14; JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 (1970). The
religious right’s attempts to demonize the Walt Disney Company over Disney corporate
policies came to naught.  See Joan Lowy, Effectiveness of Continuing Disney Boycott
Debated: SBC Ethics Chief Once Worked for Walt Disney, Torn by Conflict, CHATTA-
NOOGA TIMES, Sept. 26, 1999, at A18.  Imagine trying to demonize Disney over its being
a perpetuity.  Many readers will instantly react with a question.  How can corporations be
perpetuities when the shares can be sold at any time by the shareholders and the assets sold
or merged away by the management, while constantly being subject to Joseph Schumpeter’s
repealing the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Second, we have come to live in a world in which perpetu ities12 are
“everywhere.”   That is, we have grown accustomed to arrangements and
entities that, in one way or another, last longer than the period of the Rule
Against Perpetuities.  For instance, we accept without question the
perpetual existence of business corporations.  This was not always so.
Dramatically oversimplifying, in the 19th century, business corporations
were so mistrusted that, at the beginning of the century, many had to be
created by special legislation.13  Some saw investing trust funds in
corporate stock as evil speculation.14  There is not a lot of interest these
days in the idea of the demon corporation15 or share investing as evil
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dictum of “creative destruction?” See JOSEPH ALOIS SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM
AND DEMOCRACY 81-86 (6th ed. 1987). Yes, but corporations have a way of enduring.  See
ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 43-44 (1968).  For a very brief and recent hymn to the modern corporation, see
A Survey of the 20th Century: Freedom’s Journey, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 1999, at 1
[hereinafter The 20th Century].  Many of the author’s observations in this Article find
support in this Economist essay, which was published well after this Article existed in draft
form.  A simple recap: we do not demonize all corporations, just some of them.  Charles
Hurwitz and Maxxam Inc.’s attempts to cut down old growth redwoods in California come
to mind. See Frank Clifford, Last-Minute Deal Reached on Headwaters, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 1999, at A3.
16 Some, however, do appear to be open to the evils of speculation. Speculation is a
topic of current interest. See, e.g., EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL SPECULATION (1999) (providing a history of speculative manias that
informs an analysis of the recent bull-market binge and defining the essence of speculation
as “a Utopian yearning for freedom and equality which counterbalances the drab
rationalistic materialism of the modern economic system with its inevitable inequalities of
wealth”).
17 See, e.g., Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835
(1980).  See generally NONPROFITS AND GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT
(Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 1999) (discussing essays on charities), cited
in Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 TENN.
L. REV. 687, 694 n.16 (1999).
18 See generally LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 110 (1955)
(explaining why charitable trusts can exist in perpetuity). Charities have been exempt from
the Rule Against Perpetuities for centuries, because of the social good they provide.  We
have been comfortable with perpetual charitable corporations for centuries.  One scholar has
noted: 
The word corporation came into use in Saxon times to describe religious
institutions and monastic orders as well as religious persons.  The parson of a
parish or an order of friars was regarded as a corporation by prescription and was
therefore a separate legal entity which could exist in perpetuity.  Present day
corporate concepts have their roots in these early views. 
FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 13, at 16-17.  In the United States, charitable corporations date
back to earliest colonial times.  In 1756, the Massachusetts General Court granted one of the
earliest corporate charters in the United States to the “Feoffees of the Grammar School of
the Town of Ipswich to administer a private bequest in the interest of public education
there.”  Id. at 40. 
19 College endowments are discussed in Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and
the Democratization of Dynasty, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 873 (1997); Joel C. Dobris, Real Return,
Modern Portfolio Theory, and College, University, and Foundation Decisions on Annual
speculation.16
We coexist happily, at some mythic waterhole, with perpetual
nonprofit foundations,17 charities,18 college endowments,19 and pension
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Spending from Endowments: A Visit to the World of Spending Rules, 28 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 49 (1993).  
20 See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW (3d ed. 2000) (discussing pension trusts in the context of benefit denials,
fiduciary duties, and pension plans).
21 The law has recognized charitable perpetuities for centuries, but the idea that “the
perpetual charity is my friend” is, the author submits, a 20th century artifact.  The growth
of this view paralleled the disappearance of mortmain. Oversimplifying, the Rule does not
apply to charitable trusts.  See DOBRIS & STERK, supra note 3, at 772-74.
22 For an eloquent hymn to the pension, see ROSS MACDONALD, BLUE CITY 8-10
(Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1947), quoted in Joel C. Dobris, Book Review, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 625,
634-35 n.112 (1991) (reviewing J. EEKELAAR & D. PEARL, AN AGING WORLD, DILEMMAS
AND CHALLENGES FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (1989)):
“But after all, life begins at sixty-five.” . . . . 
“It’s for different reasons entirely that my life began at sixty-five. That was when
I qualified.”
“Qualified for what? Voting?”
“Qualified for the old age pension, son. Ever since then I’ve been my own boss.
No more getting pushed around, no more licking asses, not for me! Nobody can’t
take that pension away from me.”
“It’s a great thing,” I said. 
. . . . 
“It’s a wonderful thing. It’s the most wonderful thing that ever happened to me in
my life.”
“Can you imagine what they did to me?” the old man said.  “And that was when
I couldn’t walk yet after my second stroke.  They put me out in the county
poorhouse, with nobody to look after me except my chums out there. They said
all the hospitals were full.  I still have some of the bedsores I got then.  And then
they weren’t going to give me my old-age pension, even after I qualified.” . . . .
 “Now I got me a little place of my own under the stairs at the warehouse, and
nobody can say boo to me.”
Id.  See also LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 20.
23 Mickey may not last that long.  See Marc Gunther, Eisner’s Mousetrap, FORTUNE,
Sept. 6, 1999, at 106.  Of course, there is opposition to extending (or even recognizing)
intellectual property rights.  See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study
of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281
(1970).
trusts.20  Try to imagine complaining successfully that the Red Cross or the
Salvation Army is a noxious perpetuity,21 or that the traditional pension
trust is a tool from the devil’s workshop.22
We accept long-term intellectual property rights; for example, we are
prepared to consider giving the Walt Disney Company very long-term
rights to exploit Mickey Mouse.23  As Professor Michael Froomkin likes to
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24 Mickey’s long life is discussed in Jon M. Garon, Media & Monopoly in the
Information Age: Slowing the Convergence at the Marketplace of Ideas, 17 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 491, 524 (1999).
25 For a theoretical discussion of these ideas, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees,
Pensions and the New Economic Order, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1519 (1997).
26 See Gary R. Stout & Robert L. Barker, Roth IRA Planning, 186 J. ACCT. 59 (1998).
27 Again, a few “spoilsport” law professors do care.  See Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors as
“Licensors” of  “Informational Rights” Under U.C.C. Article 2B, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
945, 952 (1998).  The “ultimate” perpetuity might be a perpetual trust, holding the shares
of a perpetual corporation that exploits intellectual property perpetuities.  One is reminded
of Professor Meir Dan-Cohen’s personless corporation.  See MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS,
PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 46-51
(1986).   The author thanks Professor Thomas W. Joo for pointing out this resource.
28 See Shelly K. Schwartz, Leaving an IRA to Your Heirs, at
http://cnnfn.com/1999/10/18/life/q_stretch/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2000).  Professor Bruce A.
Wolk has prepared an illustration showing how $1 million before taxes, put in an IRA at
age 70, can grow to $11 million after taxes, under specific circumstances. See LANGBEIN &
WOLK, supra note 20, at 430.
29 See Brian Layman, Perpetual Dynasty Trusts: One of the Most Powerful Tools in the
Estate Planner’s Arsenal, 32 AKRON L. REV. 747 (1999). For a discussion of top-hat
pension planning in a different context, see Bruce Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified
Retirement Plans: Good Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV. 419 (1984).
30 See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2g (amended and approved as “Proposition 13,”
1978).
31 See Joel C. Dobris, Foreword, The Modern Family Fragmented, 22 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 691 (1989).
joke, “Copyright exists for a period of Mickey’s life plus five years.”24  No
one cares that the Walt Disney Company appears capable of lasting forever
or that it wants its intellectual property to last a long time, too.
Lawyers,25 accountants,26 and the upper-middle class27 are bom-
barded with articles about techniques for keeping pension and IRA benefits
“going” for at least a generation.28  Obviously, the idea is that the longer
advantageous arrangements exist, the better.29  As with so many things, the
longer the better.
Californians have lived in a world where Proposition 13 real estate
tax preferences were inheritable.30
Rent control apartments in New York City are inheritable within
families.31 Again , only a few theorists will carp about this.  Most people do
not care, or wish  they had the advantage of these arrangements for
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32 See Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes
and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517 (1984).
33 The Bush, Kennedy, Cuomo, Gore, and even Taft families come to mind. See
STEPHEN HESS, AMERICA’S POLITICAL DYNASTIES (1997); BILL MINUTAGLIO, FIRST SON:
GEORGE W. BUSH AND THE BUSH FAMILY DYNASTY (1999); Lars-Erik Nelson, Legacy,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 24, 2000, at 4; David Plotz, George Bush Lite, THE PALM BEACH
POST, July 18, 1999, at 1E; Froma Harrop, U.S. Politics as House of Lords, PROVIDENCE J-
BULL., Mar. 12, 1999, at 7B; Howard Fineman, The Family Business, NEWSWEEK, June 23,
1997, at 38.
34 It is a bromide that most family businesses disappear, too.  See Deborah Stead,
Lessons About Money in Family Inc., N.Y. TIMES,  Oct. 1, 1995, at 10F.  For a discussion
of family businesses that do not seem about to fail, see SUSAN F. TIFFT & ALEX S. JONES,
THE TRUST: THE PRIVATE AND POWERFUL FAMILY BEHIND THE NEW YORK TIMES (1999);
NIALL FERGUSON, THE HOUSE OF ROTHSCHILD:  MONEY’S PROPHETS, 1798-1848 (1998);
David Barboza, At Johnson Wax, A Family Hands Down Its Heirloom; Father Divides a
Business to Keep the Children United,  N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1999, § 3, at 1.
35 In response to the reader who would argue that some of these arrangements have
nothing to do with the Rule Against Perpetuities, I submit that they are close enough to
traditional perpetuities to influence social understandings of the beast.  At least one
commentator thinks that love of the big is coming to an end.  See Gerard Baker, Boos and
Hisses for America’s Corporate Titans, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1999, pt. 1, at 27.
themselves.  The economic arguments against rent control32 are not heard
by most people.  Thus, this modest distant cousin to the fee tail survives
into the third millennium. 
We accept political family “perpetuities” without blinking.  We
embrace term limits to cut off political careers, but we embrace political
family dynasties.33  Nevertheless, dynasties appear hard to preserve.34
We have come to accept big pools of capital existing for indefinite
periods of time as benign, at worst, and beneficent, at best.35  We have a
tolerance for large aggregations of wealth and long-lived preferences that
both do, and do not, technically offend the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
We are sanctioning perpetuities right and left.
Let us consider why this change in attitude, both legal and cultural,
is underway.  For simplicity’s sake, let us assume there are several
explanations for the change.  The categories set out are somewhat artificial,
but they are reasonable and convenient.  As Oscar Wilde wrote: “The first
duty in life is to be as artificial as possible.  What the second duty is no one
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36 Oscar Wilde, Phrases and Philosophies for the Use of the Young, reprinted in THE
OXFORD AUTHORS, OSCAR WILDE 572 (Isabel Murray ed., 1989).  In a work of science
fiction, Death speaks of duty: “Without duty, what am I?”  PRATCHETT, supra note 12.
37 Cerebus is the mythological multi-headed dog that guards the gate to Hades.  See
Microsoft, Deadly Embrace, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 1, 2000, at 58.
38 Argos, or Argus, is the mythological guardian with many eyes.  See ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, available at
http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/5/0,5716,9505+1+9394,00.html?query=argus
(last visited Oct. 28, 2000).  Argos was also Odysseus’ faithful dog who watched for his
return.  See HOMER, THE STORY OF ODYSSEUS 209-10 (W.H.D. Rouse trans., 1937);
Elizabeth L. Mathieu, How to Choose and Evaluate a Corporate Trustee for Long-Term
Trusts, 27 EST. PL. 80 (2000).
39 See GRAY, supra note 5.  Many modernizing reforms have been proposed and
enacted.  
40 Professor Simes was the 20th century’s leading “dead hand” scholar.   See SIMES,
supra note 18; Lewis M. Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 707
(1955) [hereinafter Simes, The Policy].  The dead hand is also discussed in Gareth H. Jones,
The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 119
(Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977).  For many lawyers, the ultimate perpetuities piece is W.
Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638 (1938).  The 19th century’s
leader was Hobhouse.  See ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, THE DEAD HAND (London, Chatto &
Windus 1880).
has as yet discovered.”36
Our categories are as follows:
1.The harms inflicted by perpetuities are, or seem to be, diminished.
2.The need for the positives gained from perpetuities, real or
imagined, is perceived as so strong that we must allow perpetuities
to exist.
3.Society’s guardians in these matters—its lawyers, legislators,
judges, and law professors—are asleep in the gatehouse.  Only one
head of Cerebus37 is awake.  Argos38 is sleeping.
Before we go any further let us set out some simple definitions.
The Rule Against Perpetuities (“RAP,” “Rule”) in its basic form
requires that every interest must vest or fail to vest within a period of a life
or lives in being, plus 21 years.39  The point of the Rule is to limit certain
indirect restrain ts on  a l ienation and dura tion , to  limit  dead  hand 40
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41 Wealthy settlors often seek to control their objects of bounty and resent state
attempts to control them.  The second point is Bella Wong’s, University of California,
Davis, Class of 1987.  See RONALD CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH AND SOCIETY 125-29
(1982).
42 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1682).
43 See id.
44 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule,
62 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 52 (1987).
45 See Fellows, supra note 5, at 597.
46 There are a variety of distinctions that could be made among rules forbidding excess
accumulations and similar rules that are outside the scope of this Article.  The simple point
is that for an extended period we have had an agreement that from time to time property
should be owned outright as to both legal and equitable interests.  See Simes, The Policy,
supra note 40, at 707.
47 Public interest in abolishing the Rule manifested itself with the interest in the
dynasty trust.  It is convenient to say that interest in the dynasty trust came into focus with
the publication of Professor Dukeminier’s article.  See Jesse Dukeminier, Dynasty Trusts:
Sheltering Descendants From Transfer Taxes, 23 EST. PL. 417 (1996).
48 Delaware’s section 501, which allowed special powers of appointment to be
exercised in perpetuity, led to the enactment of section 2041(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 501 (2000); I.R.C. § 2041(a)(3).  For a full discussion,
see DOBRIS & STERK, supra note 3, at 794-95.
control—control of property and donees’ lives—to a reasonable period of
time.41  The modern expression of the Rule first began in The Duke of
Norfolk’s Case .42   The case allowed the arrangements to stand, with the
court retaining the right to call things perpetuities when it made sense to do
so.43  From the 17th to the 19th century, the Rule became encrusted, or
simplified, rather like the prudent man rule of trust investing,44 and finally
became the rule against remoteness in vesting.45
In today’s world, the typical perpetuity—a trust that purposely is
designed to last longer than the period the Rule allows—is a trust managed
by a trustee with modern investment powers who can sell the trust property
at any time.  However, the beneficial, or equitable interests, are tied up
beyond the period of the Rule.46
Recently, the perpetuities debate has bubbled over.47  For hundreds
of years there was a social agreement that despite the desires of rich
settlors, property should, at least periodically, be owned outright by its
beneficial owners.  Under a unique statute, Delaware has allowed perpetual
trusts for decades through the use of special powers of appointment.48
However, this opportunity never caused much of a perpetuities creation
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49 See Fellows, supra note 5, at 597; Sterk, supra note 4, at 1037.
50 This bit of history is discussed succinctly in JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER,
PROPERTY 316 (4th ed. 1998).  Professor Dukeminier’s explanation is that the change is
“pushed along by lawyers for the rich seeking tax advantages and trust companies seeking
fees for managing perpetual trusts . . . .”  Id.  Another possible explanation is that the
breakdown in barriers to communication means that ideas are taken up more quickly than
in the past.  A third explanation is that aggressive trusts and estates lawyers need something
“hot” to sell.  See Joel C. Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust at the New
Millennium, or, We Don’t Have to Think of England Any More, 62 ALB. L. REV. 543
(1998).
51 It is strange that we currently have this intense interest in perpetual trusts when there
seems to be some general agreement that most donors do not see past their own
grandchildren.  See DOBRIS & STERK, supra note 3, at 747-48.  Perhaps the notion of
“forever” is too abstract.  Might not a rule that no trust could last longer than 250 years
effectively fight off the move to repeal the RAP?  The population of people who want trusts
to last longer than that is very small, and their defenders would be few and far between. 
Perhaps the best explanation for the sea change in the use of perpetuities trusts is that
“this decade is different from the rest of the 20th century.” The 20th Century, supra note 15,
at 1.
52 Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, The Role of Legal Doctrine in the Decline of the Islamic
Waqf: A Comparison With the Trust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1191, 1211-12 (1999). 
boom.  Some midwestern states repealed either the Rule or the Rule as it
applied to trusts without causing a rush to set up perpetual trusts.49
Suddenly things seem different.50  Why now?  Interest in creating
perpetuities seems to be intense these days and the change appears best
understood as a matter of culture and society, not law.51 Why have we lost
interest in preventing dead hand control of the equitable interests in
property created by trusts?
II.  PERPETUITIES’ PERCEIVED HARM IS FADING
Let us turn to the idea that the harms, either real or imagined, that
perpetuities inflict are lesser harms today than existed when we first
embraced the Rule.  The analysis breaks down into two categories: (1) Why
do we think the harms caused by perpetuities are lessened, if we think
about such things at all?  (2) Can we say that the spillovers, harms,
negative externalities, and other inefficiencies of perpetuities, or more
specifically perpetual trusts, are less threatening than we once thought? As
Professor Schoenblum puts it, “[T]he preoccupation with perpetuities has
dissipated.”52
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53 See DOBRIS & STERK, supra note 3, at 744-48.
54 See  Lester C. Thurow,  Building Wealth,  THE  ATLANTIC  MONTHLY,  June 1999,
at 57; Maureen Dowd, Living la Vida Trumpa, at
www.nytimes.com/library/opinion/dowd/111799dowd.html  (last visited Oct. 28, 2000);
Maureen Dowd, $$$$$?????!!!!!, at
http://www.nytimes.com/library/opinion/dowd/011200dowd.html (last visited Oct. 28,
2000).  
55 “Socialism” as used here is, in part, what Professor Simon Schama calls, “the
ancient stuff about class conflict.” Simon Schama, Clio and the Zip Drive (BBC Radio
Three broadcast, Nov. 13, 1999) (a lecture in the BBC series “Sounding the Century”).
“Socialism” as used here also refers to command economies.
56 If we have a problem with these individuals, it is with consumption by their
offspring. See David Brooks & Michael Elliot, Is Washington Washed Up?, at
http://politics.slate.msn.com/dialogues/00-02-21/dialogues.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2000).
57 For example, the pre-modern public picture of Gary Wendt cost him an opportunity
to be president of General Electric.  See Diane Brady, A Capital Exercise, BUSINESS WEEK,
Aug. 9, 1999, at 44.
The standard list of charges against the perpetuity, the arrangement
that lasts longer than the reasonable period allowed by the Rule, includes
the following: perpetuities tie up the management of property and prevent
property from reaching its highest and best use; perpetual trusts concentrate
wealth to the detriment of society; all trusts unwholesomely interfere with
the character, laboring, and investment productivity of the beneficiaries;
and perpetuities lead to intergenerational inequities.53  Society views this
list less seriously than it once did, as does the majority of the legal
community.  Let us explore the reasons why. 
A. We Do Not Mind Rich People These Days
To the extent that perpetual trusts buttress the rich, and to the extent
the RAP is an attack on, or a restraint upon, rich folks, it seems that we do
not care about the Rule because we like rich folks these days.54  Socialism
is out of fashion.55  We identify with the rich.  We revere the capitalist and
the entrepreneur.56  We do not automatically associate decadence with
wealth.  And we are feeling good. 
We dislike only rich showoffs who do not charm us, people who put
on airs, a few arrogant bosses,57 and a few individuals whom the press or
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58 See Russell Baker, Only in America, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 7, 1999, at 4 (reviewing
MARGUERITE YOUNG, HARP SONG FOR A RADICAL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF EUGENE
VICTOR DEBS (1999) (noting how out-of-fashion Young’s book is in its populism and
hostility to wealth and power).
59 Professor Thurow tells us they compete for our attention as “economic winners.”
See Lester C. Thurow, supra note 54, at 58.  Maureen Dowd also addresses the question:
“Our politics is warped by money, celebrity, polling and crass behavior, and our culture is
defined by stock-market high rolling, boomer narcissism, niche marketing mania, rankings,
and a quiz show called ‘Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?’”  Dowd, Living, supra note 54,
at A25.  Intriguingly, “Who Wants to Be a Millionaire” is a Disney production.  Some of
these attitudes can be found by watching the CNBC financial program “Squawk Box.”
Ms. Dowd has written again on the millionaire in popular culture.  See Dowd,
$$$$$?????!!!!!, supra note 54, at A23.  We live in a moment of millionaires and markets.
See Michael Prowse, In the Market for a Winning Set of Clothes, FT WEEKEND, Feb. 26-27,
2000, at xxiv.
60 Thomas Nast was a famous 19th century cartoonist who lampooned the rich and
powerful.   See DAVID SHIRLEY, THOMAS NAST: CARTOONIST AND ILLUSTRATOR (1998).
61 Studies suggest that over 70% of college students assume they will be millionaires.
 See They Will Be Millionaires, USA TODAY, Jan. 24, 2000, at 1B.  That is why we have
lotteries.  
62 We even feel sorry for rich folks.  See Monica Langley, Trust Me Baby, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 17, 1999, at A1; Gary Silverman, Affluenza Hits Nouveau Rich Kids, FIN. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2000, at 1.
prosecutors choose to villainize.  We are not levelers these days.58  We see
harm most easily in grotesque extravagance, such as extravagant aggrega-
tions of land or extravagant conduct.  We do not seem to care about big
spending that is quiet or does not involve 29,000 acres, private islands, or
gold plumbing fixtures.
An additional complicating factor is that we have come to enjoy tales
of spending excess.  We love lifestyles of the rich and famous.  We identify
with the gentry, the quasi-gentry, and the pseudo-gentry, and we usually
have no problem with the self-made man or woman.  That is, we are in an
era when we tend to value rich winners.59  About the only financial villains
left, fit for some modern version of a Thomas Nast cartoon,60 are foolish
and pompous high-corporate executives who get absurd salaries for bossing
us around.  
The prevalence of lotteries enhances these effects.  The hopeful
think:  “I may be very rich on Saturday night, and then I will be glad that
taxes are low and I am free to set up gimmicky trusts.”61  Using perpetual
trusts is a rich person’s advantage and we all imagine being rich someday.62
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63 One is reminded of  the woman at the table next to Meg Ryan’s in the famous scene
in When Harry Met Sally:  “I’ll have what she’s having.”  WHEN HARRY MET SALLY
(Castle Rock Entertainment 1989).
64 See CHARLES SPENCER, THE SPENCER FAMILY (1999); Charles Spencer, Diary, THE
SPECTATOR, Nov. 6, 1999, at 9.  Spencer House, a splendid 18th century townhouse, once
belonged to the Spencer family, but is now owned by a Rothschild.  See
www.spencerhouse.co.uk (last visited Oct. 4, 2000).   The Spencers have been around a
long time.  See AMANDA FOREMAN, GEORGIANA, DUCHESS OF DEVONSHIRE (1998).
65 In 1999, in the United States, Prince Edward (the Duke of Wessex, Edward
Windsor) was seen as a charming young Brit who Hollywood was dying to meet.  In
England, he was a foolish aristocrat who had trouble making a living and who endangered
the position of the Lords and the Crown with his negative view of the British press.  See
Mark Reynolds, Storm at Edward’s Attack on Britain, EVENING STANDARD, Sept. 2, 1999,
at 1.  See generally Richard Conniff, Class Dismissed, THE SMITHSONIAN, Dec. 1999, at 98
(discussing the highs and lows of life in the British aristocracy).
66 If the Queen likes me, either I am an aristocrat (natural or born) whom the stork put
down the wrong chimney or the Queen is a really great gal.  Either way, I win.  It is another
lottery ticket.
67 The author’s subjective view is that the lawyers who know the rich best are their
trusts and estates lawyers and that most trusts and estates lawyers like their clients.  To find
fancy lawyers who dislike rich people, one must find litigators who have been involved in
the fights of the rich.  They will talk of grotesque personalities and stale perpetuity dreams.
And we all want access to rich folk’s advantages.  If the perpetual trust is
one of their advantages, then we want it, too.63 
Just as we are positive about rich people, we also are positive about
aristocrats.  Regardless of their status, we surely do not fear them.  If they
are rich, as well as aristocratic, all the better.  We need look no further than
Princess Diana as proof of this trend.  She came from one of the oldest
noble families in England.64  Few Americans had any problem with her
money, her aristocratic background, or her dynastic connections, and most
were curious about her way of life.  Most Americans are not even bothered
by the English royal family or the dynastic families of American politics.65
 The idea that “if the Queen only knew me, I am sure she would like me”
essentially sums up the prevailing mood.66  Often we are exposed to the
unattractive side of riches and dynasty because the rich have fallen from
grace, and then we take pleasure in the sorrows of others and feel
confirmed in our “decisions” not to be rich.67  We are not concerned about
the creation, or the sustaining, of an aristocracy via perpetual trusts.  Even
though family fortunes will not go from dirt to dirt in three generations if
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68 The main jobs of trusts are as follows: caring for the young and the infirm; providing
for successive ownership; avoiding government impositions like taxes and probate; and
holding together dynastic aggregations of wealth.  If transfer taxation is dropped, a primary
job of trusts will be gone.  The current interest in the dynastic function arises at the perfect
time for trust professionals, a time when the possibility exists that transfer taxation may be
abandoned.  However, if we dropped transfer taxes there would be considerably less interest
in trust creation and many fewer trusts, including perpetual trusts, created.  There seem to
be too many trusts in existence.  One way to reduce the number of trusts is to allow the
credit shelter of the first spouse to die to carry over to the estate of the surviving spouse.
This would reduce the creation of so-called credit shelter trusts.  The author thanks David
Schaengold, CPA of New York City, for this thought.
69 See ROLAND MARCHAND, CREATING THE CORPORATE SOUL (1998).  See generally
William S. Blatt, Minority Discounts, Fair Market Value, and The Culture of Estate
Taxation, 52 TAX L. REV. 225 (1997) (discussing cultural constructs in the estate taxation
of the rich).
70 Professor Holly Doremus has suggested to the author that we do not hate rich people
because we do not know they are there.  She also questions whether our nonrecognition of
the rich explains why we also do not care if they turn their offspring through eternity into
lazy “good-for-nothings.”  No one knows what goes on behind closed doors.
71 If you inherit your money, and let Bessemer Trust manage it, next year’s Rudolph
Giuliani or Joel Klein will not prosecute you.
72 The attempts by Charles Hurwitz and Maxxam Inc. to cut down old-growth
redwoods in California come to mind.  See Frank Clifford, Last-Minute Deal Reached on
Headwaters, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1999, at A1.
73 Rudolph Giuliani, a New York politician, gained fame for prosecuting Wall Street
operatives.  See generally Tim O’Brien, Go Directly to Jail, but Which One? THE
AMERICAN LAWYER, July/Aug. 1989, at 126, 128 (discussing Giuliani’s effort to keep white
collar criminals out of federal low-level security prisons).
74 In April 2000, Joel I. Klein was the assistant attorney general in charge of the Justice
Department’s antitrust division and the person responsible for pursuing the government’s
antitrust case against Microsoft.  See Marc Lacey & Eric Schmitt, Gates Keeps Washington
Dates, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2000, at C1.
the “founder” can establish perpetual trusts, no one seems to care.68
One reason we like rich people is they have good public relations.  It
is important to remember that we live in an age of public relations.69
Images of wealth often are presented in an appealing light and PR often is
used to keep unattractive stories out of the news.70  We attack the working
rich71 only when they do not attend to their public images72 and come to the
attention of an inquisitorial prosecutor like Rudolph Giuliani73 or Joel
Klein.74  We slowly are allowing M ichael Milken to rehabilitate himself
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75 In September 1999, Bill Gates announced he was giving one billion dollars, through
his private foundation and established social service charities, to fund scholarships for
minority students interested in studying engineering, science and math.  See Sam Howe
Verhover, Gates Pledges $1 Billion Gift for Students, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1999, at A1.
Whether Gates is winning or losing the PR battle is undecided.  For a positive portrayal of
Gates, see STAN LIEBOWITZ, WINNERS, LOSERS AND MICROSOFT (1999).  For interesting
insights on Liebowitz’s book, see Lock and Key, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1999, at 124.
The problem is that the Liewbowitz book was published by the Independent Institute, which
was exposed on the same day to be taking hitherto secret contributions from Microsoft to
put pro-Microsoft advertisements in national newspapers.  See id.  Books about Gates and
his business strategy abound.  See, e.g., GARY RIVLIN, THE PLOT TO GET BILL GATES: AN
IRREVERENT INVESTIGATION OF THE WORLD’S RICHEST MAN AND THE PEOPLE WHO HATE
HIM (1999) (telling the story of how Silicon Valley businessmen plotted to undermine
Gates).  Experts have predicted that Bill Gates could die with a trillion-dollar estate.  See
THE ESTATE ANALYST, A Bank of the West Newsletter, n.3 (1999) (copy on file with
author).  In the year 2000, the value of Gates’ estate is not a fact of general interest.
However, if he were to die, pay his estate taxes, and devise the remainder of a trillion
dollars in a private perpetual trust, then repercussions from these events could place the
RAP on the political agenda.  In 1999, he seemed to give away enough money to give some
PR substance to his promise to leave “all his money” to charity.  See Thomas J. Billitteri,
Who Gave the Most: Carnegie, Rockefeller, or Gates?, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 13,
2000, at 32.  Gates and the trillion-dollar estate are topics that fascinate some writers.  See
The Foresight Saga, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 1999, at 59.
76 See Robert G. Kaiser & Ira Chinoy, The Right’s Funding Father: Fighting a War of
Ideas, WASHINGTON POST, May 2, 1999, at A1.  This article details the story of a billionaire
scion of a wealthy American “aristocratic” family (the Mellons) who has had a dispropor-
tionate and major effect on American politics in the 1990s by virtue of targeted political
spending from the massive amount of inherited money at his disposal.  Depending on one’s
politics he is perceived as a hero or a villain and a poster child either for aggregations of
wealth or for breaking them up.  Yet, this story does not resonate with the public.  People
do not care.  It does not resonate, in part, because the populism of the Depression and the
generation of Roosevelt Democrats is almost gone from the scene; because we refuse to
admit we have an aristocracy; and because the subject of the story has been adept at staying
out of the news until recently.  Simply put, in an era when capitalism is triumphant, it is not
surprising that there is little concern about aggregations of wealth and the growth of a
pseudo- or quasi-American aristocracy. 
Historically, our leaders who have been concerned about abuses of power by American
aristocrats are often upper-class Americans who have been snubbed by their “betters.”  We
are told that Franklin Delano Roosevelt was concerned for the plain folk because he was
denied access to Porcellian, the Harvard senior society of his choice.  See Felipe Fernandex-
Armesto, But Where, Exactly, Are They Leading Us?, LITERARY REVIEW, July 1999, at 17
(reviewing DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN
DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929-1945 (1999)).  “Capitalists—said Franklin D Roosevelt, who
never forgave snooty undergraduate clubmen for blackballing him at Harvard—wanted
and often we appear ready to forgive Bill Gates.75  The unattractive rich
who groom their images or who stay out of public view are safe.76
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‘power for themselves, slavery for the republic’.”  Id.  The Roosevelt story is confirmed at
the Harvard web site, at http://www.harvard-magazine.com/issues/nd96/frank2.html (last
visited Oct. 28, 2000).  See Jack van Doren, Is Jurisprudence Politics by Other Means? The
Case of Learned Hand, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 24 (1998).  See generally GERALD
GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND, THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 27 (1994) (discussing the Porcellian
incident Hand experienced).  As the reader may have noticed, we do not care much about
snooty clubmen these days.
77 “So the rich today have far less direct command over people—fewer servants, fewer
exclusive services—even though they have far more command over things.” The 20th
Century, supra note 15, at 10.  As Professor Skidelsky states: “Unaccountable power always
breeds resentment, especially when it is money power.  The Rothschilds were demonized
in Europe in much the same way as J.P. Morgan was in the United States—only more so,
because they were Jewish.”  Robert Skidelsky, Family Values, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 16,
1999, at 24 (reviewing Niall Ferguson’s books, THE HOUSE OF ROTHSCHILD: MONEY’S
PROPHETS, 1798-1848 (1998) and THE HOUSE OF ROTHSCHILD: THE WORLD BANKER, 1849-
1999 (1999)). Today’s rich lack power.  We seem to be aiming our finite firepower for
fighting abuses of power at politicians. If we are concerned about undue concentrations of
money, we are being quiet about it these days.
78 Baker, supra note 58, at 6.
79 Id. (quoting CHARLES BEARD & MARY BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZA-
TION (1927)).  We are more concerned with the abuse of power relevant to gene patents.
See Paul Jacobs & Peter G. Gosselin, Firm Stands Fast on Retaining Genetic Data, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2000, at C3.
80 See The 20th Century, supra note 15, at 39-40.
To the extent we have a social concern relevant to the discussion in
this subsection, we are concerned with abuses of power.  We no longer
automatically associate abuses of power with wealth.77  Our default is no
longer that rich people (a) have power that (b) they will abuse.  Most rich
people actually appear to have little power to concern us.  We see neither
“villainous industrial despotism”78 nor 
aggressive men, akin in spirit to military captains of the past,
working their way up from the ranks, exploiting natural
resources without restraint, waging economic war on one
another, entering into combinations, making immense for-
tunes, and then, like successful feudal chieftains or medieval
merchants, branching out as patrons of learning, divinity and
charity.79  
The evil abuses of power, to the extent we see them and are bothered by
them, we attribute to corporations, some of their high executives, and a tiny
population of self-made individuals whom we erratically demonize.80  All
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81 BEARD & BEARD, supra note 79, quoted in Baker, supra note 58, at 4.
82 In 1799, six of the ten richest people in England, including all of the top five, were
“landowners.”  In 1999, only one was—the Duke of Westminster.  See Andy Beckett, Who
Wants to be a Millionaire?  THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 29, 1999, at G2.  Several of the cases
cited in this Article involve dukes.  We used to care about land when land and power were
intertwined and people were legally or practically tied to the land. See PROPERTY AND
POWER IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES (Wendy Davis & Paul Fouracre eds., 1995). Now we
care about things like the control of the human genome because it is a resource of interest
to us, not because of the money involved.  See Jacobs & Gosselin, supra note 79, at C3
(detailing how Celera Genomics denies rumor that they were demanding exclusive
commercial rights for distribution of genetic research data gathered with the help of the
Human Genome Project).
83 An opposite of blips is the category of precious goods discussed by Bruce Chatwin:
“Ever since the priest bureaucracies of Ancient Egypt . . . the upper classes have put
precious objects into depositaries.  The extent of the treasure proves symbolically the power
of the . . . State.” BRUCE CHATWIN, ANATOMY OF RESTLESSNESS 173 (1996).
84 If the topic is Michael Jordan, see DAVID HALBERSTAM, PLAYING FOR KEEPS:
MICHAEL JORDAN AND THE WORLD HE MADE (1999); MICHAEL JORDAN, FOR THE LOVE OF
THE GAME: MY STORY (Mark Vancil ed., 1999).
85 Lord Acton, quoted in The 20th Century, supra note 15, at 44.
we see when we look at rich people is the patronage—the art museums, if
you will.81
Similarly, we are not afraid of large aggregations of wealth these
days because rich people often do not control any specific assets we care
about. We used to care about land,82 but today we care about assets on
paper.  No one cares what Michael Jordan does with his money.   No one
cares if a great deal of wealth is concentrated in his hands.  The undue
concentration of money is not a social concern for most people today.  If he
owns any unique assets, other than his own human capital, no one has told
us about them.  No one cares if the choses in action that he owns, the blips
on computer screens and the paper behind them, are tied up for more than
a life or lives in being, plus 21 years.83  Indeed, most people likely trust him
to use his money wisely. Forgetting Michael Jordan, which admittedly is
hard to do,84 no one cares if the senior securities representing a forty-seven
percent interest in the future cash flow of a sub-franchisee of a reorganized
roast beef sandwich empire that has 112 rural retail outlets in the southeast
of America is owned by a trust that may last for 150 years.  We all know
that “power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely,”85 but
the settlors of the trusts in question are basically people without power, as
far as we know.
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86 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPTER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY, 81-86 (6th
ed. 1987).  For example, the English press is full of stories about the troubles of Marks &
Spencer.  See Face Value: Try, Try Again, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 8, 2000, at 13.  Yet
another example in early 2000 is the entire car rental industry’s pricing scheme being under
attack by an upstart company.  See Tim Burt, Easy to Provide Mercedes in Rental Venture,
Mar. 1, 2000, at 13.
87 See Gregory S. Alexander, Pensions and Passivity, 56 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS.
111 (1993); Bruce A. Wolk, Comment: Pensions and Passivity, 56 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROBS. 111, 141 (1993).
88 According to Professor Gans, the Rule has been criticized on libertarian grounds. 
See Mitchell M. Gans, Federal Transfer Taxation and the Role of State Law: Does the
Marital Deduction Strike the Proper Balance? 48 EMORY L. J. 871, 878 n. 30 (1999) (citing
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(1985)); Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of
Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 704-05, 710-13 (1986)).
89 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). The movement to allow
“self-spendthrifting” of assets in trusts is second cousin to the movement to repeal the Rule
Against Perpetuities, in that both glorify property owners’ rights and question perceived
public policies against such self-centered arrangements.  See John E. Sullivan, III, Gutting
the Rule Against Self-Settled Trusts: How the New Delaware Trust Law Competes with
Offshore Trusts, 23 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 423 (1998).  We live in a self-centered time.  See
Andrew J. Cherlin, I’m O.K., You’re Selfish, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1999, at 45.  Professor
Cherlin refers to a time of  “[u]tilitarian individualism . . . [of] going West . . . to find your
fortune.”  Id.
Furthermore, because the market changes vastly for stocks and
commercial real estate—the typical assets that are held in trust—the public
hardly worries about dead hand control of the assets, compared with the
value and the equitable interests created by the trust.  Companies, favorite
brands, and even industries can disappear overnight in the creative
destruction of capitalism.86  It is beginning to appear as if our economy can
thrive without regard to who owns the assets as long as the asset owners
leave the managers alone.  There is an argument that, in fin de millennium
America, who owns society’s assets is irrelevant assuming those assets are
put to work.  Indeed, maybe we benefit most if passive trustees, often
pension trustees, hold society’s assets.87
We live in a libertarian age.88  We are in the business of revering the
property owner.  The property owner knows best.  We are back to believing
that property owners should have a full bundle of rights.89  Strangely, we
are delighted with centralization of capital but determined to see decentral-
ization of government.  Are these trends related?  It is chiastic.  Today
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90 See DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE
BATTLE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE THAT IS REMAKING THE MODERN
WORLD (1998).
91 As Russell Baker puts it, “Nowadays, . . . political discourse is limited to exalting
material excess and the acquisitive instinct . . . .”  Baker, supra note 58, at 6.  See also
GEORGE BAKER & GEORGE SMITH, THE NEW FINANCIAL CAPITALISTS (1998).  Of course,
the statements in the text are exaggerations for emphasis.  
92 Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption, Human Nature and the Reconstitution of
Social Order, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1999, at 59. Not all readers of Professor
Fukuyama are fans.  See The 20th Century, supra note 15, at 17.  In another writing, another
Anon is quite specific: 
Like all bourgeois philosophers, the current triumphalist philosopher of
capitalism is an Hegelian.  In his book, The End of History and the Last Man
(1992) Fukuyama offers afresh the ruling class’s recurrent theory of history as the
globalization of capitalism, arguing that with the collapse of the Soviet Bloc the
liberal democratic market economy has become the last remaining universal
ideology and therefore not an ideology at all but the end of history itself.  
TWO HUNDRED PHARAOHS, FIVE BILLION SLAVES.... MANIFESTO 31 (1999).  As the
anonymous quote indicates, Professor Fukuyama previously wrote of the end of history.
See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).  As noted, it
seems fair to say Professor Fukuyama is a student of global capitalism.  This Article is
about the end of the Rule.  We all must write about the end or the death of something.  See
ARTHUR C. DANTO, AFTER THE END OF ART (1997); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of
Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996).
93 See Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth
Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1985).
94 See Fukuyama, The Great Disruption, supra note 92, at 59.
socialism in all its forms is very much out-of-fashion and capitalism rules.90
In an era when everyone flies the capitalist flag, being free to do whatever
you want with your money91 comes up trumps.  We love our entrepreneurs
and are inclined to give them whatever they want, especially when all they
are asking for is perpetuities that we do not fear giving them anyway. This
all may be cyclical, and the cycles surely are related to the economy.  Good
times mean we do not care.  Bad times mean we bust up those aggrega-
tions.
Thus, Professor Francis Fukuyama posits that one of the important
ideas of the last forty years is that the political right “did not want
communities putting constraints on what people could  do with their
property . . . .”92  Doing what you want with your property is, of course,
one of the key explanations and justifications for perpetuities.93 Fukuyama
also tells us that the left has no interest in opposing the right on this front.
All  the left wants, he tells us, is lifestyle freedom.94  No counterforce
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95 We once were concerned that the rich would abuse their power.  See Baker, supra
note 58, at 6.  Baker noted that “[b]ig money’s arrogance was eloquently expressed in
Henry C. Frick’s comment after the bloody crushing of the Homestead steel strike in 1892:
‘We had to teach our employees a lesson and we taught them one they will never forget.’”
Id. 
96 We are concerned, erratically, about excessive executive compensation and the
growing gap between the rich and the not rich in our society, but no one seems to be making
any Rule Against Perpetuities connections.  As to the gap, see EDWARD LUTTWAK, TURBO-
CAPITALISM: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (1999).  The global
economy is also considered in John Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge, A Future Perfect:
The Challenge and Hidden Promise of Globalisation (2000).
97 See Heller, supra note 4, at 1180.
98 We are in a time of giant aggregations of capital.  See Steven Lipin, Trend Shows No
Company is Immune to a Takeover, WALL ST. J. (Euro. ed.), Nov. 22, 1999, at 7; Steven
Syre & Charles Steen, Tenacious Redstone Savors Biggest Deal, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 8,
1999, at D1 (discussing the announcement on September 7, 1999 of the huge Viacom/CBS
merger as reported on September 8, 1999).  
99 See General Electric, The House that Jack Built, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1999,
at 23.
100 C/R=PV is the equation for the present value of a future income stream, where
C=cash to be received, R=rate of return, and PV=present value.
opposes property freedoms. 
In summary, we are not out to get the rich.  W e are not particularly
worried that they will abuse the power of their money95 and act irresponsi-
bly.  We are not concerned that unearned wealth or wealth in excess of
earning is dangerous to society.  To the extent that the Rule Against
Perpetuities is designed to keep wealth in check96 or to aid in wealth’s
fragmentation,97 it is not seen as serving a central social purpose at this
time.
B. We Like Big Capital Pools and Do Not Wish to Break Them Up
We see good in big pools of capital, not harm.98 We are not
concerned about the disappearance of assets into giant pools.  We see the
economies of scale, and we see the budgets sufficient to bring us new
technologies, to help us enter and thrive in the global economy, and to give
us national prosperity.99 More money is better.  We recognize, value,100 and
transfer interests in these perpetual commercial pools all the time.  These
are good friends.
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101 While we are fans of small companies, charities, and magazines, we also remain
fans of the idea that fractionalization of capital is bad.  See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S.
704 (1987); Schoenblum, supra note 52, at 1191.  Perhaps an explanation is that the small
company that is focused on a single idea is not fractionalized at all.  It is just small for the
moment.  To be pro-RAP is to be pro-fractionalization.  This is so because the RAP forces
property out into freehold ownership once every 90 or 100 years, and usually into the hands
of a relatively large number of owners.  At that point the assets are reduced below the
“critical mass” of the trust.  There is a bit of primogeniture and feudalism in our rejection
of fractionalization.  It is submitted that rich people have more children than people of more
ordinary means.  If this is correct, then the fractionalization problem is exacerbated,
although the fractions are pieces of big pies.  At least one commentator would have it that
we are ill-disposed towards corporations. See The 20th Century, supra note 15.
A close reading of this Article may reveal sets of parallel views attributed to laypeople:
(1) big pools of money are good; big pools of money are bad and (2) we never have been
richer; this money could disappear overnight.   One is drawn to mental health images by
way of explanation.  One is that it is schizophrenic.  The other is that it is “paranoid
optimism,” a term used to harmonize observations offered in The 20th Century.  Id. at 2.
The author, unnamed in the piece but known to be Bill Emmott, defines paranoid optimism
as “the hope that this year’s wine will be better than ever, mixed with the fear that it might
be ruined by too much sun.” Id. 
102 It took some remarkable misconduct for the citizens of Hawaii to turn on the
Bishop Trust, and even then, the complaint seemed to be with the trustees, not the trust.  See
Bruce D. Collins, At the Non-Profit Bar, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 6, 1999, at 7.
We look at big charities, foundations, pension trusts, and for-profit
corporations without concern.  They are familiar and make it hard for us to
get excited about “bad” perpetuities.  We have lost some faith in the idea
that these giant charities and corporations can solve all problems or are the
be-all-and-the-end-all, but we basically are quite accepting of them,
provided there is freedom and room for smaller entities.  To the extent they
succeed on our behalf, they please us.  To the extent they do not, we tend
to see them as sad old dinosaurs, headed for some corporations natural
history museum, about to be replaced by a successful, inevitably small,
start-up corporation.101  We seem to have no problems with pension funds.
Everybody wants a pension. 
This good we see in capital pools, in  other contexts, colors our ideas
about money held in trust.102   Fractionalizing trust principal at the end of
the RAP period does not seem like a particularly good idea to us.  Trusts,
including perpetual trusts, shelter under this pool umbrella.  Paradoxically,
we pity those who are attached to large entities, as we dream of our own
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103 In the winter of 2000, graduates of Harvard Business School who go to work for
large corporations are called “dropouts.”  The preceding sentence is based on hearsay.  The
fight for business school graduates is discussed in America’s Talent Battle, THE
ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 2000, at 75.  Things have changed.
104 The point is made by many commentators, including: ZYGMUNT BAUMAN,
INTIMATIONS OF POSTMODERNITY (1991); HARRY C. BOYTE, COMMONWEALTH (1989);
JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1954); JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN
FACTS AND NORMS (William Rehg trans., 1996); HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL
MAN (1991).
105 If trusts do not interfere with the functioning of the market economy, then we have
lost a key argument for controlling them and thus interfering with the settlor’s wishes. See
Alexander, supra note 93, at 1189.
Internet companies.103
At best, we seem to associate big pools of family wealth with charity
and benign expenditures.  At worst, we do not care.  There are always a
few exceptions, of course.
C. We See Virtue in Perpetual Existence
Just as we see good in giant capital pools, we see good in perpetuities
other than those established for private trust purposes.104  Like big charities
and foundations, big pension trusts and giant for-profit corporations are
giant pools that also have perpetual existence.  Again, we associate worth
with perpetual existence.  We seemingly embrace syllogisms of this sort:
“The pension trust is my friend.  Pension trusts are perpetuities. Ergo,
perpetuities are my friend.”  The huge aggregations of capital in these
perpetuities have not interfered with the functioning of our market
economy.   More specifically, the huge aggregations of capital in
essentially perpetual pension trusts have not interfered with the functioning
of our market economy.105  Indeed, one’s pension is often one’s major
financial asset.  Therefore, it seems fair to say we live in a world where
perpetual (pension) trusts are mighty nice things.
We have grown so accustomed to perpetuities that we do not
distinguish between allowing them to exist, in whatever form, and allowing
them, or the income streams they produce, to be subjected to dead hand
control.  
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106 The truth is that we now understand that dead hand control of management is about
the dumbest thing in the world.  That means that very few lawyers are drafting such trusts
these days.  See In re Pulitzer’s Estate, 249 N.Y.S. 87 (Sur. Ct. 1931), aff’d mem., 260
N.Y.S. 975 (1932); Stanton v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 310 P. 2d 1010 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Matter of Pope, Bowen and Citibank, N.A. N.Y.L.J., Jan. 16, 1996, at
27, col. 1 (unpublished opinion).
107 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 13, at 16-17, 40-41.
108 Dead hand control of property management does not concern us, nor does
concentration of wealth or dead hand control of the equitable interests.
We face several issues: (1) Should entities be allowed to exist in
perpetuity?  (2) Should deceased owners of property, whether they are
grantors of legal interests or settlors of trust interests, be allowed to
determine how property is managed as investments in perpetuity?
(3) Should deceased owners be allowed to determine who gets the income
or the use of property in perpetuity?
We have answers that are formed and answers that are inchoate.
Those answers are: (1) A variety of entities may exist in perpetuity.
(2) Deceased owners may not determine how property is managed in
perpetuity except to the extent they can manipulate the rules of charitable
trusts and corporations.106  (3) Now we are wrestling with the third
question—can private trusts exist that control the emoluments that flow
from investments in perpetuity?  
A partial explanation of the current perpetuities-friendly environment
is a failure to discriminate among these perpetuity questions.  This failure
to discriminate may exist because it is only since the 19th century that there
has been a meaningful disconnecting of these three issues: (1) allowing an
entity to exist in perpetuity outside of the charitable context,107 (2) allowing
dead hand control of property management, and (3) allowing dead hand
control of property’s perpetual income streams.108  We understand that
many wise investments are made by, and in, entities with perpetual
existence and that much that is good comes from the commercial and
eleemosynary perpetuities.  This Article submits, among other things, that
this warm bath of good feelings has sloshed over onto personal trusts,
usually trusts for families.
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109 See, e.g., Colonial Trust Company v. Brown, 135 A. 555 (Conn. 1926) (holding a
restraint on alienation imposed by trust to continue during the existence of lives of persons
in being and during lives of their children invalid and holding that a court may order the
sale of real estate, devised in trust, after expiration of trustee’s power of sale).  The courts
will not allow a settlor to interfere with the development of  downtown Waterbury.
110 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE, § 227-29
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS]; UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2
(amended 1994), 7B U.L.A. 280 (2000).   This act is discussed in John H. Langbein, The
Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641
(1996).  The idea that money held in trust is lazy money, not efficiently invested, is a fading
idea.  One can find it in SIMES, supra note 18, at 60-61.
111 This point derives from the author’s reading of Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the
Watchers? The Securities Investor Protection Act, Investor Confidence, and the
Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1126 (1999). 
D. We are W ell-Disposed Towards Trusts
To the extent we view the Rule as forbidding the creation of
perpetual trusts, we live during a time when the general view is that
modern trusts do not do much harm.  Indeed, they do some good.  At this
point, getting excited about how long modern trusts last is somewhat
difficult.  How has this public sentiment come to be?  The answer is
actually quite simple.
First, in this day and age, few restraints on the alienation of the trust
corpus by the legal titleholder, the trustee, exist.  Therefore, no legitimate
concern arises that the assets held in trust will fail to reach their highest and
best use.  Additionally, if the rare trust comes along that does provide a
restraint on alienation that interferes with the wise investment of the
corpus, other ways of dealing with the problem exist.109  Indeed, at this
point in time, there are arguments that assets held in trust may be better
invested, or at least as well-invested, as nontrust assets.  Many trustees can
be counted on to do a good job of investing, and longer-lasting trusts give
investing trustees more leeway to invest well.  Furthermore, because of the
trust investment reforms of the 1990s, there is a legally mandated
mechanism requiring trustees to educate themselves about their duty to
invest wisely, and more specifically, according to modern portfolio
theory.110  Individual investors do not have a similar duty, nor does any
third party have a duty to inform these individual investors.111  At least one
can hope that a trustee’s attorney will tell the trustee of the duty to invest
wisely, according to the tenets of modern portfolio theory.
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112 Perpetual trusts offer the ultimate in time diversification of assets.  Time
diversification is the thought that “the risk of stocks declines as the investment horizon
increases.”  Kenneth L. Fisher & Meir Statman, A Behavioral Framework for Time
Diversification, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May-June 1999, at 88.  If the trust lasts forever, the
trustee can afford to hyperdiversify into equity investments and prosper.  And society,
thanks to that investment, will prosper, too.  For a discussion of the proper annual pay-out
from such a trust, see Garland, supra note 10, at 50.
113 Two reasons combined assets swell are that large pools can attract superior
management and can enter into arrangements to reduce transaction costs.
114 See B. Pawlowski et al., Evolutionary Fitness: Tall Men Have More Reproductive
Success, 403 NATURE 156 (2000). 
115 See TIFFT & JONES, supra note 34.  We are quick to think of nice rich people like
those that run the Times, or the Rothschilds.  See FERGUSON, supra note 34.
116 A five and five power is a nonrecurring, tax-oriented power in a beneficiary to
remove the greater of $5,000 or 5% of the trust corpus annually.  See DOBRIS & STERK,
supra note 3, at 656-57.
One can reasonably argue and hope that money held in perpetual
trusts will be invested wisely, with the long view in mind.  If a trustee sees
the trust fund as an endowment, then hope exists that the trustee will invest
it wisely, and “for the ages,” which many would see as investing a majority
of value in equity with an emphasis on diversification and even venture
capital investments.  Inherent in thoughtful equity investing and stable
pools of capital is social value.112 
Second, one may rationally argue that assets held in  trust in the
modern world can grow dramatically.  Assets held together swell.113  As
stated, we are inclined to the idea that bigger is better.114
Third, family corporations, with a commitment to a region or to
employees, often are held in trusts to assure continuity.  The New York
Times, with its commitment to dignity and service, comes easily to mind.115
Knowing that an institution like the Times is held together in part by a trust
creates in the minds of many some mild good feeling for trusts.  
Fourth, modern trusts give something akin to ownership to the
equitable beneficiaries.  In other words, modern trust interests are often
more like fee ownership than some people realize.  This trend is a relatively
recent phenomenon.  If a beneficiary has the trust income, a five and five
power,116 a broad special testamentary power of appointment, and the right
to seek principal for health, education, support, welfare, and
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117 All the powers enumerated in the text are blessed in section 2041of the Internal
Revenue Code.  See Amy Morris Hess, The Federal Taxation of Nongeneral Powers of
Appointment, 52 TENN. L. REV. 395 (1985).
118 The advent of modern portfolio theory for trustee investors and the advent of
presumably pliable and distant mutual-fund-associated trustees supports the view expressed
in the text.  If trust property were going to be tied up in perpetuity in trusts that did not
allow for modern investing, then the willingness to tolerate perpetual trusts might vanish,
even though alternatives to freeing the property from trust every 90 or 100 years exist that
can alleviate burdensome administrative restraints.  The tax savings and the protection from
creditors that most settlors will be seeking arguably outweigh the financial risk, if not the
moral hazard.  Modern portfolio theory is discussed in Andrew S. Butler, Modern Portfolio
Theory and Investment Powers of Trustees: The New Zealand Experience, 7 BOND L. REV
119 (1995).
119 Someone surely will argue that there is nothing like ownership.  True, but as
ownership comes more and more to mean passive ownership of a bland index of financial
products, it is more difficult to get excited about the difference between owning something
outright and being a beneficiary of the modern trust that owns it.  There is the risk, not
much noticed in current discussions (but real nonetheless), that a distant trustee may
become a tyrant and may be unwilling to reduce or terminate a trust when it means the loss
of trustee fee income.  There are real issues of capture of assets and beneficiaries.
120 A spendthrift restraint typically prohibits the voluntary or involuntary transfer of
the beneficiary’s equitable interest in the trust. See DOBRIS & STERK, supra note 3, at 513-
30.
maintenance,117 we are less concerned that the beneficiary is not the owner
of an equitable, or legal, fee simple.  Trust law and drafting patterns give
beneficiaries (and perhaps, therefore, the law) reasons to remain content to
be deprived of a legal fee simple.118  If one chooses to view many trust
beneficiaries as the owner of a quasi-fee equivalent, then an important
argument about beneficiary autonomy and personal fulfillment disappears.
To oversimplify, beneficial trust interests today are something like
ownership.  Accepting this notion explains, in important part, why we are
lackadaisical about the potential for harm of perpetual trusts. Pliant
trustees, especially in the case of perpetual trusts put into distant jurisdic-
tions, combined with drafting of a sort of which judges of yesteryear could
not even conceive, grant beneficiaries tremendous access to trust emolu-
ments.  Therefore, they are, in truth, less subject to dead hand control.119
At that point, with the trustee able to sell the assets at any time and the
beneficiaries often able to do much of what they wish with their equitable
interests (even though they may be subject to spendthrift restraints120 on
alienation), a legitimate question arises:  “What dead hand?”  Arguably,
and theoretically, the current arrangements are not perpetuities from the
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121 See Alexander, supra note 93, at 1264.  In addition, trusts that allow access to more
than about 3% of the combined income and assets of a trust are unlikely to last in
perpetuity.  They will be consumed by invasions or by the overproduction of investment
return taken in the form of traditional income.  Thus, this is a bit of a tempest in a teapot. 
122 See Mary Louise Fellows, Spendthrift Trusts, Roots and Relevance for Twenty-First
Century Planning, 50 REC. ASS’N B. CITY  N.Y. 140 (1995).  Professor Susan French raises
the possibility that money is good for trust beneficiaries.  See French, supra note 4, at 352.
Oscar Wilde leaves the question open in Lady Bracknell’s allusion to the topic: “Her
unhappy father is, I am glad to say, under the impression that she is attending a more than
usually lengthy lecture by the University Extension Scheme on the Influence of a permanent
income on Thought.” Oscar Wilde, The Importance of Being Earnest (1895), reprinted in
THE OXFORD AUTHORS, OSCAR WILDE 489 (Isobel Murray ed., 1989).
123 For a discussion of moral hazard, generally and in another context, see Joo, supra
note 111, at 1126, 1129-35.  We live in a world where concern about moral hazard is not
particularly high.  We save hedge funds and savings and loans.  As to hedge funds, see
ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG TERM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT (2000).  As to savings and loans, see LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE SAVINGS
AND LOAN DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION (1990).
One of the arguments against all trusts, including perpetual ones, is that they offer a safety
net for beneficiaries that creates a moral hazard as to their conduct.  If we are less open to
that attack on trusts, then trusts look less bad to us.  And if trusts in general look less bad to
us, then so do perpetual trusts. Work is an important component of a healthy life. The
concern has always been that the trust beneficiary denied the opportunity or need to work
will become a waste.  One argument for allowing a settlor to so undermine her children and
grandchildren is that she knows them best and has their personalities in mind and their
interests at heart.  If she still insists on undermining them then she likely knows what she is
doing and must have internalized the moral hazard.  It is hard to make this argument as to
unborn generations in perpetuity.  At that point, the balance is gone. See HOBHOUSE, supra
beneficiaries’ point of view.  Therefore, the legal system’s historic
interference with the donor’s freedom of disposition is perhaps less
justified.121  It is necessary to complain from the viewpoint of creditors or
society.  Ultimately, society’s complaint is reduced to:  “We don’t like
barons and dukes and permanently rich people.”  Paradoxically, the truth is
that we actually do like them at this moment in time. 
Fifth, today there is no strong sense of trusts’ having a bad effect on
beneficiaries.  There once was a time when the general consensus was that
trusts were bad for beneficiaries, and that trusts made beneficiaries weak or
lazy.  Today, fewer people talk about the “sissification” of beneficiaries.
The only people who do are a few law professors122 and some old-
fashioned trustees.  Expressed differently, there is little concern about a
moral hazard in a beneficiary’s having an equitable interest in assets not
earned and, when it is the case, assets creditors cannot reach.123
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note 40.
A lesser argument is that we live in a time when people become adults more slowly
than ever, and therefore need the protection of a trust for a longer period of time.  This
justification for property in trust is one more modest reason to be disposed toward trusts.
124 See Alexander, supra note 93.
125 See Dobris, supra note 50.
126 See Alexander, supra note 93, at 1208; Fellows, supra note 122.  Simply stated, a
trust designed to stick a finger in Uncle Sam’s eye should not be ended because of a
sentimental concern about the “sissification” of beneficiaries if the beneficiaries’ equities
approach fee ownership.
127 French, supra note 4, at 352.
128 See generally Epstein, Past and Future, supra note 88 (claiming that the common
law Rule Against Perpetuities is no longer needed in contemporary society).
129 The need to reboot one’s computer is discussed in Tom Foremski & Christopher
Price, Software & Computer Services, Microsoft Stresses Value Against Rivals, Gates
Heralds Windows 2000, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2000.
The traditional view is that the Rule is a complex, but sensible,
compromise between the donor’s freedom to donate and dominate as the
donor wishes and the donee’s freedom to have untrammeled access to
capital.124  Given the new millennium world of compliant trustees and
broad powers of invasion in trustees and even beneficiaries, there is room
to argue that the modern trust beneficiary’s equitable interest is akin to
outright ownership.125  Given this conclusion, there is room to argue that no
dead hand dilemma exists.  To hold such an interest is to be an autonomous
person and not a weak and constrained trust beneficiary.126  In further
support of this line of reasoning, Professor Susan French has pointed out
that we cannot be so sure that a nice family trust is bad for people or for
society.127
To conclude this subsection, with assets held in trust being traded
every day and with modern trusts, particularly those expected to last a long
time, in the same vein as fee ownership, property is free to migrate to its
highest and best use.  Thus, the common law’s traditional antipathy toward
restraints on alienation is not buttressed as meaningfully as it once was by
the Rule Against Perpetuities.128  We do not seem to care much about the
idea that it is good for property to be owned outright at least once every
100 years, just as it is good to reboot your computer every so often,129 or,
if you live in the desert, to take your dog to the High Sierra to kill its fleas
once every winter.  The thought that it is good for society if trusts end
every 100 years to kill that which is wrong with them is not weighty these
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130 See ABE LAUFFE, BROADWAY’S GREATEST MUSICALS 101-05 (rev. ed. 1977)
(discussing Brigadoon, a musical by Alan Jay Lerner and Frederick Lowe about a town that
comes to life every 100 years).
131 And not by taxing them, either.  A rule designed to control the conduct of the
landed aristocracy seems unnecessary to many today.
days.  We do not believe in “Brigadoon.” 130  The current attitude is that
there is nothing wrong with trusts.
E. Fighting About Perpetual Trusts May Be a Tempest in a Teapot
We may well have concluded that whether trusts are allowed to last
90 or 100 years, or forever, is not a matter of great import—that it is all a
tempest in a teapot.  Even though interest in perpetual trusts is high, one
wonders how many trusts are created, and if the effort to beat the
dynastically minded at their own game is worthwhile.  One also wonders
how long these trusts actually will last.  The point is, why bother fussing?
It may well be that so few people will create, or want to create,
perpetual private trusts that whether they exist simply does not matter,
especially in a world full of perpetual pension trusts, foundations, and
corporations.  
Or, it may well be that whether or not we allow such trusts does not
make much difference either way.  
Scholars can argue that the true social purpose of the Rule is to rein
in the rich, or to mix animal restraint metaphors, to put a collar on them.
However, they also can argue that we have come to see that the RAP really
does not affect rich folks much at all.  At that point it becomes more
efficient simply to drop the Rule because it has become a paper tiger.  That
is, if the Rule does not do its job of keeping the rich off balance, why
bother?  We are less interested these days in sticking pins in rich folks and,
to the extent we feel the need, we do so with antitrust and criminal
prosecutions, not by tearing down their trust structures.131
Moreover, the RAP may be a tempest in a teapot to the extent that
many rich folks are creating perpetual instruments through foundations and
business corporations.  These entities are sanctioned perpetuities, and the
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132 The author has always believed that operating a private foundation or public charity
in a completely above-the-board manner while still deriving great advantage from it is very
easy.  Without creating a manual for such activity, consider these ideas: one can buy
necessary, quality products at a fair price from friends and relatives; one can make
charitable distributions to favorite charities of one’s friends; one can give their children
summer jobs or put them on the board; and one can schedule board meetings in resorts.  For
a discussion of some of the property aspects of foundations in a specific context, see Evelyn
A. Lewis, When Entrepreneurs of Commercial Nonprofits Divorce: Is It Anybody’s
Business? A Perspective on Individual Property Rights in Nonprofits, 73 N.C.L. REV. 1761
(1995).
133 Our love of money is nothing new.  “I know of no country, indeed, where the love
of money has taken stronger hold on the affections of . . . [people] . . . .” ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, BOOK ONE 42 (Random House 1972) (1835).
What has changed is the 18th century American’s “nearly universal disdain for aristocracy
and any non-republican show of wealth.” WILLIAM W. BEACH, THE CASE FOR REPEALING
THE ESTATE TAX 3 (1996).
rich seem to know how to use them over the generations for their own
profit.132  So, maybe the barn is empty and we should address other entities
to the modest extent we are levelers.
Why not let rich people make messes, especially if the trustees are
continuing to invest rationally in society’s assets?  If they disadvantage
their offspring, this just demonstrates survival of the fittest. Why not let the
devil take the hindmost?  Why should we care so long as the money is
invested properly from a social viewpoint?  If there is no stealing, no tax
evasion, and the beneficiaries are kept off the welfare rolls, what is the
harm?  All trusts inevitably involve laxity, moral hazard, and externalities.
F. The Hunger for Money Outweighs Concerns About Perpetual Trusts
Another reason for the perception that perpetuities are less harmful
is that money hunger is very strong these days.  The standard perception is
that trusts are devices to conserve wealth and save taxes.  To make a joke
of it, the only problem with a trust today is that the trust is not big enough.
The point is, more people want more money than ever before.  The
new millennium finds the nation obsessed by money.133  And even you,
dear reader, would be happy to have some.  Many readers of this Article,
especially if their characters and situations seem set and secure, would be
delighted to have extra, unearned money.  On a sliding scale, they likely
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134 See Silverman, supra note 62, at 1.
135 An “anonymous” author has noted that “[M]any intellectuals in the West still
consider capitalism to be immoral: too devoted to a vulgar worship of money, too
dependent on greed, too deeply founded in adversarial individualism.”  The 20th Century,
supra note 15, at 9.
136 A successful, bright, and well-educated lawyer friend asked once, “What are you
teaching today?” to which I answered, “The Rule Against Perpetuities.”  He replied,
“What’s that?”
137 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & ANNE L. ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 188
(1999).
138 Schama, supra note 55.
139 See Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255, 263-69 (1994).
See generally Kevin R. Johnson, “Melting Pot” or “Ring of Fire”?: Assimilation and the
Mexican-American Experience, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1259 (1997), 10 LA RAZA L.J. 173
(1998) (discussing the limitations on assimilation for Mexicans entering United States
would prefer to have money (1) outright or (2) in a very flexible trust with
the reader as trustee.  They would even derive pleasure from a more
traditional, and perhaps even a stingy, trust.  Most would not fear the
influence of the money or the trust on their lives or personalities.  They
might, however, be concerned about the effect on their offspring.134  In
other words, you probably do not see any harm in the money or the trust
beneficiary status for you.  As we know, dear reader, you are not
materialistic or greedy.135
G. The General Public Does Not See the Perpetuities Issue
The harm is so esoteric that seeing it or caring about it is difficult.136
Perpetuities are a silent killer, if you will.  In discussing this Article with
laypeople, one finds little comprehension of why a Rule Against Perpetu-
ities exists, or why this Article was written.  Hating the perpetuity is a
sophisticated and cerebral emotion, one akin to the feeling of the social
leveler (a rare bird these days).  The body politic is likely to hate only a
rich cad or splasher who splashes on us in ways we cannot appreciate.  As
Professors Ackerman and Alstott have stated, “The general public has no
patience for a policy debate that speaks a technocratic language accessible
only to people with advanced degrees.”137  As Professor Schama has
related, we have “to make it clear to people just what they were fighting
for.”138  If people are going to care about perpetuities, the idea must be
explained to them with stories of excess and of baronies that deeply
offend.139  There must be a clear public policy justification, which arguably
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society).
140 As Lady Bracknell declared, “What between the duties expected of one during
one’s lifetime, and the duties exacted from one after one’s death, land has ceased to be
either a profit or a pleasure.  It gives one position, and prevents one from keeping it up.
That’s all that can be said about land.”  Wilde, supra note 124, at 493.  For a recent
discussion of English land law in an American context, see David A. Thomas, Anglo-
American Land Law: Diverging Developments From a Shared History, 34 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 143 (1999).
141 Some states have dealt with the residual concern about land by repealing the Rule
only as it applies to trusts of personalty.  See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 305/4 (2000).
142 See generally John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse
Possession, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 816 (1994) (stating that property rules often are pro-
development, arguably to the detriment of conservation and environmental interests).
143 See Eagle Enter., Inc. v. Gross, 349 N.E.2d 816 (N.Y. 1976).
144 See Estate of Coates, 652 A.2d 331 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
is missing in this day and age.
H. The Rule is a Land-Based Relic in a W orld of Financial Assets
At heart, the Rule is about land,140 and we are no longer land-minded
in the areas of wealth or trusts.141   We only care about land when an issue
of land use is before the court.  Today, wealth lies in securities.  And we
cannot become very excited about whether or not some shares get tied up
forever.  The corporate assets likely will reach their highest and best use
even if owned by the trustee of a perpetual trust.  Additionally, to the extent
land fails to reach its highest development use, a meaningful segment of the
population is delighted.142  When we are faced with land use issues, we still
care about perpetuities, but we virtually never think about land in the
context of perpetual trusts.  Perpetual equitable servitudes affecting land
use get short shrift in the courtroom.  When that happens, a close reading
of the case shows meaningful judicial hostility to the perpetuity.143  If a
trust is set aside because there is a violation of the Rule, there is a musty
odor in the air when the judge strikes down the perpetuity.144  There is no
genuine judicial, or indeed social, concern manifest.  It is just a case in
which another lawyer blew it and got caught out after dark.
Why do we still care about perpetuities affecting land but not trusts
in perpetuity (probably even trusts of land)?  W hy does no one seem to
want covenants and equitable servitudes to last forever?  The likely
difference is that trustees of perpetual trusts can sell the property so the
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145 See French, supra note 4, at 352.
146 See id. at 349 (discussing the pre-Restatement view of trustee investors).
147 One can argue that we do not care about land in perpetual trusts because we care
less about land as part of our disinterest in civil society.  The prosperous among us live
inside land moats and do not care what is done to land outside our gated communities.  The
waning interest in civil society is mirrored in a waning interest in public land use.
148 See Colonial Trust, 135 A. 555.  See generally French, supra note 4, at 348.
149 Local jurisdiction over the trust may be nonexistent when there is no property
within, or trustee contacts with, the jurisdiction and when the beneficiaries have no way of
influencing the trustee.  However, many offshore trustees might well respond to contempt
proceedings against a beneficiary who has the trustee’s ear.  A local court could not
directly, or likely even indirectly, affect a trustee’s administration or the trust’s terms
without the cooperation of the jurisdiction in which the trust is located.
legal title, or the use of the property, is not tied up forever.  Only the
equitable title in the trust corpus exists in perpetuity.  Thus, the assets can
migrate to their highest and best use,145 except to the extent that trustees are
too conservative as investors.  The bugaboo of the conservative trustee
investor is losing power in the new, mandatory world of trustee investors
who must hyperdiversify, measure risk, and take risk as appropriate.146  Our
willingness to undo perpetuities affecting land use and our disinterest in
perpetuities affecting trust interests suggest that we know perpetual harm
when we see it, and we zap it.147  This distinction and disinterest further
suggest that we might know what we are doing when some of us seem
willing to tolerate perpetual trusts.
When land is important (or when anything becomes as important as
land once was), we will not tolerate dead hand control.  Simply stated, the
Colonial Trust case148 tells us we are not going to let some dead guy mess
up the face of downtown Waterbury, Connecticut.  Similarly, if one guy
tried to put all of Alaska into a perpetual trust, then you would hear some
howls.  We also are protected to the extent that most meaningful land
transactions involve bank financing, and banks possibly will not do
business with perpetual trusts in the foreseeable future.  Often banks want
more than the real estate as security, and trustees are unlikely to sign loans
in their individual capacity.  Also, foreign trusts are likely to be unattrac-
tive to the typical loan officer.149  So, the innate conservatism of the lending
officer may protect society for a while.
Financial securities do matter, and two points are relevant.  First, in
our current global economy, there is no equivalent of land as it mattered in
England in an earlier time.  Second, no one has devised a method for, or is
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150 We can be certain that if one person controlled the Internet, or the World Wide
Web, and put it into a perpetual trust in Alaska, something would be done.
151 See In re Pulitzer’s Estate, 249 N.Y.S. 87.
152 See Alexander, supra note 93.
153 See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (1999) (emphasizing
the incredible mobility of today’s investment assets).  Capital mobility is cited as a partial
explanation for the rise of the so-called  “International Trust.”  See id.; Jeffrey A.
Schoenblum, Preface, The Rise of the International Trust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L LAW
519, 520 (1999) (including as explanations “[t]he rise of the geographically extended family
. . . [t]he rise of a universalist culture . . . [t]he rise of the offshore jurisdiction . . .
[e]nhanced national and state regulatory regimes . . . [and] [t]he clash of legal regimes”). 
154 See Gordon, supra note 44.
155 See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT, supra note 110.  See generally Langbein, supra
note 110 (summarizing the Uniform Prudent Investor Act).
156 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, supra note 110; UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR
ACT, supra note 110; BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE
PRUDENT MAN RULE (1986); Halbach,  supra note 3, at 531.  CalPERS, the California
public pension system, is investing in hedge funds.  See Hedge Funds Galore, FIN. NEWS,
Jan. 3, 2000.  Yale invests in everything.  See James M. Clash, By Invitation Only, FORBES,
Apr. 17, 2000, at 446 (recounting Yale investments in so-called “private equity funds”
which out-hedge-fund hedge funds). Were trustee investment patterns to become socially
currently interested in, tying up securities in  perpetuity.150  How could you
redeem stock to affect stock prices, merge, acquire bank loans, hire MBAs
with stock options, or engage in “creative destruction” if the stock was tied
up in knots?151
An important part of the social policy behind the Rule was to make
land and other assets more mobile.152  We live in a world where much of
America’s wealth is incredibly mobile.  Much of that wealth is held in
perpetual pension trusts where those financial assets retain their mobility.
Capital mobility, formerly land mobility, fails as an explanation for the
Rule because wealth no longer equates to land and because today’s wealth
is very mobile153 and often is successfully held in perpetual trusts. 
Historically, capital mobility has been constrained by the conserva-
tive investment policies of trustees.154  This drag on mobility became an
argument for forcing assets out of trust every 90 or 100 years.  The
argument that trustees invest too conservatively for society’s good,
necessitating that assets are owned outright every hundred years or so, is
undone by the new prudent investor rule.155  Now trustees can invest in
almost anything and may end up as better investors than their fee-owning
neighbors.156
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unwholesome, we might prefer a return to the RAP, forcing assets into fee ownership every
100 years.
157 Professor Bruce Wolk, Professor of Law at the University of California, Davis,
School of Law, has suggested to the author in conversation that the lack of interest in land
as a public good suggests a lack of interest in public and civic space, which is symptomatic
of the deterioration of civil society.  
158 This view can be traced back to BERLE & MEANS, supra note 15.
159 Professor Alexander sees more import in the ownership of an equitable trust interest
than is demonstrated in the text.  See Alexander, supra note 93.  Exploring such a thought
is beyond the scope of this Article but is worthy of note and instructive in this discussion.
To conclude this subsection, let us note that land is less economically
important today, and that is part of the disinterest in RAP.157  What is
important economically, choses in action, currently are not being enmeshed
in perpetual restraints on alienation.  Finally, to the extent that we do care
about land, we have ways of dealing with perpetuity perpetrators. 
I. Wealth Held in Corporate Form Does Not Require a Perpetuities
Restraint
The previous subsection suggested that we are not concerned with
who owns our choses in action, our corporate securities.  We may be
flirting with the idea that who owns corporate stock is irrelevant for
purposes of efficiency and growth, because the managers really have the
opportunity to manage the corporate assets and are, in some vague sense,
the actual owners,158 or close enough for capital efficiency and protection
purposes.  Therefore, we do not care if the shares are held by a trustee, who
can always sell them, or if the owner of the income stream, the equitable
beneficiary, is far removed from ownership.  In truth, “all” the shareowners
are far removed from ownership.159  
J. Trusts No Longer Interfere with the Functioning of the Credit
Economy
The modest argument that trusts can be bad for commercial creditors
(and that perpetual trusts would be even worse), to the extent trusts are
spendthrift, has lost its power.  Perpetuities had the weak effect of
protecting creditors indirectly because, even if the trust was a spendthrift
trust, the underlying assets eventually were owned outright once every 100
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160 The one group who does care is credit card companies, who overextend credit to
spendthrifts and want Congress to make it harder to shed credit card debt in bankruptcy.
See Robert Reno, Free Market Solved Bankruptcy Crisis, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 10, 2000, at
9B.  Professor Lischer likely would disagree.  See generally Henry J. Lischer, Domestic
Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to Liability?, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 479
(2000) (disapproving of debtors’ ability to evade creditors through asset protection trusts).
161 See Tina Kelley, When Collection Software Runs, Debtors Can’t Hide, N.Y. TIMES,
May 6, 1999, at G1.  The credit card companies seem to feel differently.  See Reno, supra
note 160.  Ex-spouses and children are another group who may be greatly affected.
162 Society could require spendthrift trustees to buy liability insurance for beneficia-
ries, but is not likely to do so.
163 In a sentence, “civil society” comprises citizens, in their own communities, solving
problems.  See Pam Solo, Beyond Theory: Civil Society in Action, BROOKINGS REV., Fall
1997, at 8. That we do not care as much as we should about civil society is frequently
discussed.  See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, CIVILITY: MANNERS, MORALS, AND THE
ETIQUETTE OF DEMOCRACY (1998) (examining ways incivility is reflected in our culture
and looking for a way to change it); EDWARD SHILS, THE VIRTUE OF CIVILITY, SELECTED
ESSAYS ON LIBERALISM, TRADITION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY, (Steven Crosby ed., 1997)
(arguing that civility is a societal necessity).  David Starkey, writing of Anthony Giddens
and civic culture, wrote: “Now we are consumers, not citizens. And we primarily look to
business, not government.”  David Starkey, The LSE, Blair’s College Cabinet, THE SUNDAY
years and then creditors could feast.  In other words, the assets came to life
once every 100 years like Brigadoon.  We do not seem to care much about
creditors these days socially,160 and so the weak pro-RAP argument that it
is good for creditors is weightless.  Moreover, it can be argued that lenders
and creditors do not care about spendthrift trusts because they have such
dramatic computer power to determine a borrower’s assets and to collect
their debts.161  Lenders and creditors also have the power to demand interest
sufficient to cover their computer-calculable bad debt losses.  So the cry of
creditors’ rights is a hollow one.  The tort creditors (also known as
“creditors of adhesion” or involuntary creditors) are the ones who care.
They basically are protected, to the extent they are, by the tortfeasors’
insurance, if any,162 and the failure on the part of the settlor to make the
trust spendthrift.  Continuing to restrict the life of trusts to the RAP period
will do little or nothing to enhance the functioning of our credit economy.
K. The Support that the Rule Gives to Civil Society is of No Interest
These Days
Lastly, we live in an era in which the commitment to a so-called
“civil society”163 and the interest in public life is at a low point.  One of the
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TIMES, Mar. 21, 1999 (News Review), at 7.
164 Baker, supra note 58, at 6.  In diction not often seen these days, Baker refers to
“Big money’s arrogance . . . .”  Id.  Bill Gates is not arrogant in the eyes of many people.
Just as we are sure the Queen would like us if she knew us, we are sure Bill would, too.
165 Professor Mark Ascher puts forth his arguments against aggregations of wealth in
Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1990).  According to
Professor Angela M. Vallario, the abolition of the Rule in Maryland was accomplished
without informing the academic community.  See Vallario, supra note 6, at 160 n.194.
166 Perpetuities repeal is referred to neutrally and under the heading “Modernization of
Trust Law” in Marc S. Bekerman & Gerry W. Beyer, Trusts and Estates Practice into the
Next Millennium, PROB. & PROP., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 7, 9-10.  See also Kent A. Gernander,
Remembering Justice Blackmun, at http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2000/
jul00/prezpage_7-00.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2000).
167 See GARY SCHARNHORST, HORATIO ALGER, JR. (1980).
most powerful arguments against perpetuities is that they undermine
democracy and, thus, civil society and public life.  Given our apparent
current disinterest in such things, one of the most powerful standard
arguments against perpetual arrangements is not heard as clearly as it once
was.  Commentator Russell Baker recently stated, “[N]owadays . . .
political discourse is limited to exalting material excess and the acquisitive
instinct.”164  We are in a moment in time when we do not care about such
things as civic virtue.   To the extent perpetual trusts interfere with civil, or
civic, society, we are not too interested.  This is discussed more in section
C of this paper.
To conclude this section, we no longer care as much about the anti-
perpetuities bogies of restraints on alienation and long duration, poor
investing of trust assets, or the “sissification” of trust beneficiaries;
therefore, we do not see the harm in perpetuities we once saw.  Perhaps the
RAP has done such a good job in dealing with those problems that we have
lost track of the evils.  Perpetuities, in the abstract, frighten only a few law
professors,165 a few left-of-centrists, and the law students who must learn
the Rule.166  Although some law professors see in perpetuities a dog that, at
best, has not bitten in a while, laypeople see a good dog, or no dog at all.
We are at a point in time when trusts are on a pedestal, and the idea of
allowing a trust to last longer looks like an encore at a good concert, not a
dreadful societal error.  Trusts are being sold everywhere as good, no one
is selling perpetuities as bad, and all kinds of petite  and haute bourgeois are
pretending they are, or soon will be, rich.  We continue to believe that if we
are good and work hard, then we will become rich.  The belief conjures
Horatio Alger all over again 167 and explains why the people of California
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168 See Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259,
285 n.150 (1983).
169 David Schaengold, a New York City CPA active in the trusts and estates field and
law reform, has suggested, in a private communication, that individuals of a given level of
wealth who formerly had one trust, now have five, because of their perceived need for
trusts.  Internal Revenue Service figures suggest that the number of trust income tax returns
(1041s) is increasing annually.  See Frank Zaffino, Projections of Returns to Be Filed in
Calendar Years 1999-2005, 1998-1999 IRS STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN, PUBLICA-
TION 184.  Computer technology and techniques have reduced the costs of administering
trusts, especially when discretion need not be exercised and little hand-holding is required.
And there are always new uses for trusts in our era of trustification.  
170 The statement that there is a perceived increase in a “need” for perpetual trusts is
based on subjective judgment, observation, and decades of working in the trust field.
According to Mr. Schaengold, there seems little doubt that the use of trusts is increasing.
overturned the state death tax by popular referendum.168  We do not hate
the rich, we are not social levelers, and therefore we cannot support the
RAP. People also often pretend that the rich are just like them and would
surely like them if they knew them.  No one remembers the Czar.  We have
lost interest in the Brigadoon argument— that owning assets outright once
every hundred years is good for society in the following ways:  (1) a family
will be free of the crippling, weakening, “sissifying” effects of trusts;
(2) the property will be free of restraints on alienation; and (3) if the trusts
are spendthrift then creditors will be getting a shot at some assets. 
So, we have seen the primary reasons why society is unafraid of
perpetual trusts, and we have spoken briefly of whether society should be
afraid or not.  Obviously, this era of good feeling is cyclical, and the day
will come when the rich will be unloved.  Many implications may follow
from that change someday.
III.  THERE IS INCREASED 
PRESSURE TO ALLOW PERPETUAL TRUSTS
 
Let us turn to the idea that the need, or at least the hunger, for
perpetuities (perpetual or very long-term trusts) is greater than in the past.
This Article takes the position that the wealthy population’s perception of
the increased need for trusts,169 and for perpetual trusts in particular, has
contributed to these recent changes in the law.  In other words, the pressure
to allow perpetual trusts is greater than usual, and the debate is asymmetri-
cal.170
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See Schaengold, supra note 169.  IRS figures support his perception.  See Zaffino, supra
note 172 (indicating that 3,406,000 fiduciary income tax returns on Form 1041 are expected
to have been filed in 1999.  Form 1041 filings are expected to go up by 1.28 % a year
through 2005.). 
171 “I know of no country, indeed, where the love of money has taken stronger hold on
the affections of . . . [people] . . . .”  TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 133.  But, money hunger
does not necessarily induce extra risk taking.  Indeed, risk aversion when wealth is achieved
makes rich settlors more interested in sure returns obtained from tax advantage.  See Dobris,
supra note 14, at 279-80, 286-88.  This is, paradoxically, a risk-averse era, and all anchors
to windward are welcome.
172 Putting assets into a trust “forever” does not doom them to underperformance.
Trust law reforms of the 1990s freed virtually all United States trustees to invest in a
modern fashion.   See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, supra note 110; UNIF. PRUDENT
INVESTOR ACT, supra note 110.  See also Langbein, supra note 110 (discussing in detail the
motivations and effects of the reforms under the Uniform Prudent Investor Act).
173 On October 1, 1999, the New York Times carried a story of people moving from
welfare to the work rolls, arguably vindicating the discredited “trickle-down effect” of the
1980s.  See Elisabeth Bumiller, A Night for Giuliani to Pay Tribute to the Reagan Legacy,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1999, at B7.  As the cartoon character in The New Yorker stated, “See,
Jimmy? If they give a big tax cut to the wealthy, those guys’ll feel good and have us come
fix their roof and stuff.”  Weber, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 6, 1999, at 27.
Obviously, the feeling that there is a need for perpetual trusts by an
articulate and prosperous segment of the community increases the pressure
to allow trusts, especially if resistance is low.  Let us consider the reasons
for the perceived need for perpetuities.  Why is demand up?
A. People are Obsessed with Money
The first reason for the increased demand for perpetuities is that we
are more interested in money than we have been in a long time.  We are
money-obsessed.  People who care about money feel they need more of
it.171  Perpetual trusts offer a way to lever assets by way of tax advantage
and concentration, and they offer a way to protect capital assets
“forever.”172
Why the obsession with money?  There are several explanations.
The first is the “Mean Streets” explanation.  In a tough world, people feel
they need all the money they can lay their hands on.  At first, this idea may
seem absurd.  In the fall of 1999, when these words were first written, the
economy was in splendid shape.173  However, there are clouds on the
FALL 2000 The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities  643
174 “[C]apitalism has proved worryingly unstable.” The 20th Century, supra note 15,
at 12.  And worried people save more.  See id. at 17.  “[I]n the mid-1990s, when richer
people have been scared that their luck was about to turn,” repealing the Rule was in vogue.
Id. at 27.  If  rich folks are scared, it is because they perceive a risk to their situation.
Perceptions of risk in finance are discussed by many, including PETER L. BERNSTEIN,
AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 178 (1996) [hereinafter Against the
Gods].  
175 See Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n., 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994).
176 Professor Lischer discusses this fact in quoting a highly visible asset protection
lawyer.  See Lischer, supra note 160.
177 For general discussions of civil society, see CARTER, supra note 163.
178 “‘It requires a great deal of boldness, and great deal of caution, to make a great
fortune; and when you have got it, it requires 10 times as much wit to keep it.’ So said
Nathan Mayer Rothschild, the leading figure of the Rothschild banking dynasty, at a dinner
party in 1834.” John Gapper, Dynasty’s New Direction, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1996, at 18
(quoting DAVID KYNASTON, THE CITY OF LONDON: A WORLD OF ITS OWN (Chatto &
horizon.  Financially, these are frightening and volatile times.174  There is
a hunger for protection, for insulation from the cruel world and isolation
from its problems.
Indeed, we might call this the age of insulation and isolation.  Many
people want to be insulated from society and isolated from its problems.
There is nothing like money for insulation and isolation, and one of the
many things money buys is access to skilled legal advice.  Skilled legal
technicians have always worked in equity.  Today, they produce the
equitable servitudes that make a gated community work175 and the trust
terms that make a variety of clever trusts, including the trusts we are
talking about, work.  Forgetting what is socially “good” or “best,”176 these
equitable interests are so obviously good for isolating and insulating the
prosperati that the only negative aspect of the devices is that being isolated
and insulated is bad— bad for the isolated and bad for society.  Equitable
interests are insulating the prosperous folks as part of the assault on civil
society.177
Just what is to fear out there?  Let us catalog a few of the monsters in
the closet.
Wealth seems at risk.   Much of the new wealth is recently captured
and seems unlikely.  It often is (or should be) hard to have faith in the
possibility of accumulating more wealth that will not evaporate.  At that
point there is a strong desire to secure, conserve, and maximize wealth.178
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Windus 1994).
179 There is a curious chiastic relationship between willingness to take risks to earn
money and risk aversion once the money is earned.  Arguably, this explains the desire to
protect oneself with a trust, and partly explains the desire to protect one’s descendants with
a perpetual trust.  See Dobris, supra note 14.
180 See Caroline Daniel, Hybrid Freeserve Seeks Pathway to the Internet’s Riches, FIN.
TIMES, July 12, 1999, at 20 (entailing how Freeserve receives commissions from telephone
company for encouraging toll-paid use).
181 Jack Ayer, Professor of Law at the University of California, Davis, School of Law,
has commented that new wealth that falls out of the sky on you must appear impermanent
to thoughtful people.  
182 Peter L. Bernstein, the eminent finance commentator, has called these assets
“kickables” in his private newsletter.  See Robert H. Jeffrey, Reflections on Portfolio
Management After 25 Years, ECON. AND PORTFOLIO STRATEGY (Peter L. Bernstein, Inc.,
New York, N.Y.), Nov. 1. 1999, at 1.  Bernstein is also the author of Against the Gods,
supra note 174.
183 Today’s knowledge economy is discussed in W. Chan Kim & Renee Mauborgne,
Strategy, Value, Innovation and the Knowledge Economy, 40 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 1, 41
(1999). 
It seems impermanent.  It is not like land, or even a brick and mortar
manufacturing business with lots of machines making things.  Prospect
theory tells us that the fear of loss is very powerful in making financial
decisions.179  If I have grown rich from one piece of software, or a plan
sketched on a napkin to offer free Internet service and make money on
commissions from the telephone company,180 or a financial spasm that led
me to pay a few thousand dollars for a web notion, then I may doubt
whether I can continue to earn a living in that way or transfer my vision or
my skills to my offspring.181  All I have is money, at best, or stock in a new
company.  I may want to protect the asset (or at least some of it) more than
the nineteenth-century brewer or manufacturer who could imagine the real
estate, the machinery,182 and the franchise passing to descendants who
could be trained to continue the business.  Physical capital is devalued, and
therefore the hunger for perpetuities is stronger.  People want to safeguard
their prosperity.
Wealth based on knowledge seems to some more ephemeral than
wealth based on natural resources or bricks and mortar.183   Human capital
is less secure in its value than physical capital once was.  This feature is
especially true if the value depends on the ability of one mind to create
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184 Society’s social capital is volatile, too.  See Fukuyama, The Great Disruption,
supra note 92, at 59.  Thurow, supra note 54.  Thurow, who sees this era as the third
industrial revolution,  might well disagree.  Professor Gregory Alexander also has noted that
trust law changes at times of industrial revolution as people scramble to protect their
families.  Professor Alexander focuses on changes in spendthrift trust doctrine at the end of
the 19th century during the second industrial revolution. See Alexander, supra note 93.
185 To stick with the “weather” imagery in the text, some settlors fear a global tsunami.
186 All things degrade to the mean, including extraordinary stock returns.
187 See ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 137.
188 The blue-collar perpetuity, the job at the mill for your offspring, is gone.  The
working stiff is out of this game.
189 It is the frightening “amorphous globalization of cyberspace.”  Schama, supra note
55.  See also Joe Rogaly, Ethics Today: We are Far from a Globalised Globe, FIN. TIMES,
Apr. 10, 1999, at 3 (Weekend Section) (discussing Professor Anthony Giddens’ Reith
Lecture on BBC Radio 4 on the ethics of globalization, published as ANTHONY GIDDENS,
RUNAWAY WORLD (1999)).
wealth.  That person will grow old and die someday.184  That person may be
“washed up” at an early age.
As stated, today’s wealth seems impermanent.  New wealth often
does.  This means one must make hay while the sun shines.185  No
participant in the new economy is any different than a sports star.  That
means make money fast and tuck it away.  Some investors do not have
sincere faith in the new economy186 and thus become poseurs. They become
the equivalent of arms dealers at that point.  If you trust no one you are
more ready to play trust games of various sorts.  This wealth is all so
ephemeral that we have to salt it away.  Once upon a time you could trust
land, but not today’s wealth. 
Paradoxically, the new wealth being captured is large in amount.
Professors Ackerman and Alstott tell us that a small part of the population
is capturing more and more of the wealth.187  So, perpetual trusts capture
not only wealth, but also relative advantage.  Once you capture wealth and
relative advantage you want to keep them.  The best way to keep them may
well be in a perpetual trust.
Fortunes are being made and the fortunate want to secure them.  The
more ordinary population in our society, the middle-class, who are really
upper-middle class, want to secure their “fortunes” too.188  The new
economy is so new that many people do not believe its advantages are
transferable.189  Only the cash is transferable, and so we are interested not
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190 We all understand that you must invest in your kids early on.  See John H.
Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 722 (1988). Why not invest in more than just an education, and why not put it in a
trust?  And, while you’re at it, bartender, make it a double – a perpetuity.
191 The author tells his students that they all will be fired, that they should have a
year’s living expenses in the bank if at all possible, and that they should live as frugally as
they can bear to live until they have enough money to support themselves and their
dependents, if any, for the rest of their lives.  Of course, this is an exaggeration for
emphasis, but a useful one nonetheless.
192 See Thurow, supra note 54, at 66; NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN MERITOCRACY (1999).
193 See Thurow, supra note 54, at 68.
194 See Alexander, supra note 93, at 1195.
195 See JOHN A. BRITTAIN, THE INHERITANCE OF ECONOMIC STATUS (1977).
196 See Cherlin, supra note 89; Brooks & Elliott, supra note 56.
only in providing a grubstake for our kids, but also in protecting more than
that.  In this strange time, it is not clear what can be transferred other than
property and money.190  Great law firms close and partners without enough
clients have only their savings and a few straggler clients left.  Other great
firms survive, but partners are fired.191  Again, those without clients have
only their savings left.  Strange people succeed, and well-prepared people
fail.192 
Insecurity in life lends legitimacy to the quest for security through
trusts.193  Wanting to arrange family property settlements unimpeded is
natural, and courts often have looked the other way.194  Much that is
questionable gets done in the name of the family.  Never eat in a “Family
Restaurant” is one way of putting it.  Another way of putting it is that the
most dangerous place in suburban traffic is in front of the grade school as
the morning bell is about to ring.
Today’s society has become very dangerous, and more and more kids
need protection because they will not be able to earn a good living.  It is
easier to believe that grandpa’s money must last forever because his
shiftless offspring (1) are going to need more of it in the dangerous new
world (2) and are not as likely to be able to make their own way in the new
technocratic world.  Many children will not succeed, and they will “need”
to be trust beneficiaries.  Not all offspring will be smart or educable.  It is
harder to pass opportunities to one’s nearest and dearest.195  
Just when we lose faith in government and society,196 it gets worse
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197 In an essay about Belgium, Professor Tony Judt describes the very dreary state of
government and society in that prosperous, but unhappy, nation.  He writes that “[s]ome
observers even hold the country up as a postnational model for the twenty-first century:  a
virtually stateless society, with a self-governing, bilingual capital city whose multinational
workforce services a host of transnational agencies and companies.”  Tony Judt, Is There a
Belgium? N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 2, 1999, at 49.  If that is the future, is it any wonder that
people want protection through trusts?
198 “As an aggressive investor, therefore, I want my . . . [conservative] investments to
be my harbor from stormy seas . . . .” DAVID W. HUNTER, NEVER OUT OF SEASON 138
(1992).
199 See Alexander, supra note 93, at 1217.
200 The only way to sell the right to create a perpetual trust, to sell a license, if you
will, in our federal system, is through the tax system.  Perhaps a perpetuities stamp sold by
the federal government might be more useful than the generation skipping transfer tax. 
201 Basically, we have lost faith in government’s taking care of us.  In addition, large
numbers of Americans in the year 2000 have given up on the government as an agency to
redistribute wealth (if that is a goal of many people today).  The agency costs are too high.
Similarly, the interest in the government providing community amenities or ameliorating
poverty is small.  See ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 137.  Of course, this will change
someday.  Professor Wilentz of Princeton University claims the turning point has arrived.
See Sean Wilentz, For Voters, the 60s Never Died, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1999, at 27.
Professor Wills assures us we hate Washington.  See GARY WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL:  A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT (1999).  Others call it a “temporary
out there.  And so, we need the money and perpetual trusts.  As the state
does less and less for us197 (because it is weak, because it does not care
about us, or because we demand more) the prevailing feeling is that me and
mine need more money than ever before.  Me and mine need to save taxes
and avoid creditors, via trusts, more than ever before.  In other words, “We
demand that you let us put more away for our ever more needy loved ones.
We all need an anchor to windward, a bolthole, a safety net.”198
The law is sentimental about the family, and Professor Gregory
Alexander notes that judges have been flexible when changing trust law for
families.  As he has stated, the “unforeseen needs of families” inspire a
special interest in trusts and trust law reform.199  Families can have tough
times, or fear they will, and they think society should cut them some slack.
Sentimentality about the family combined with tolerance for perpetual
corporate organizations and charities means we are learning to live with
perpetuities.200
Our society also suffers from a declining faith in government.  We
have lost trust in government201 as a source of necessities, amenities, and
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anti-political era.”  Brooks & Elliot, supra note 56.
202 See Dobris, supra note 52; Fukuyama, supra note 187, at 70.  To expand on this
point is dramatically beyond the scope of this Article.
203 But see Jeff Madrick, How New is the New Economy? N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 23,
1999, at 42.  Of course, interest in redistributing society’s assets is at a low.
204 See, e.g., JOHN D. MACDONALD, THE SCARLET RUSE (1973).
205 At least one author has suggested that loss of faith in government is a function of
a poor economy and has further suggested that the better economy of the late 1990s has
increased American confidence.  Taken at full value, this could lead to a decrease in interest
in perpetual trusts.  See Madrick, supra note 203.  Professor Lischer suggests that legitimate
trust planning easily can lead to illegitimate trust planning.  See Lischer, supra note 160.
206 See Robert M. Berdhahl, Remarks and Addresses at the 76th Annual Meeting,
A.L.I. 43 (1999).  The costs of education (and health care and old age) seem huge to the
middle class.
207 See The End of the Company Pension, THE ECONOMIST, May 15, 1999, at 77.  We
refuse to see Social Security as a reliable pension, in that we feel that we must rely more on
ourselves and less on government.  See NPR Morning Edition: Taking Care of Themselves
(NPR radio broadcast, May 21, 1999).
208 See Bradley T. Hudson, Changes Hurting Tempe, THE ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 5,
2000, at 4 (Chandler Community section).
209 See Berdhahl, supra note 206, at 45.
protection.  We also have lost faith, or perhaps interest, in civil society and
the rejuvenation of public life.202  In the last few years, large numbers of
Americans have given up on the idea that the government is a better
spender or redistributor of money than individuals or charities.203  One must
be prepared to provide for and protect oneself and one’s descendants and
provide what the government does not.  When one does not have faith in
society and government, one tends to want money.   Detective novel
authors have been making the point for years.204  Money hunger leads
inevitably to trusts and then quickly to perpetuities.  Lost faith in govern-
ment means that it is easier to hear the siren song of legitimate, dramatic,
tax avoidance using perpetual trusts.  The public perception is:  why waste
one’s money on a “useless” government? 205
The perception is that government is doing less for the type of people
who set up perpetual trusts.  From their point of view, “everything” is
private, including education,206 pension,207 street protection,208 and
recreation.209  The general feeling is: why pay more taxes than you must?
Why assume that you or yours will be a consumer of government services
beyond roads, cops, soldiers, Coast Guard rescues, and some basic research
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210 We are clearly taken by the corporate view of things.  Michael Elliott recently
posed the question, “Has there ever been a time when business people had higher prestige
and fewer sworn enemies? I don’t think so.”  Brooks & Elliot, supra note 56.
211 See Thurow, supra note 54, at 69.  The global economy is considered in many
works, including BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD (1996); FRIEDMAN, supra
note 153; WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT (1997).  The globalization of
law is discussed in William Twining, The MacDermott Lecture, 50 NO. IR. L.Q. 12 (1999).
212 Opportunities to beat local laws by buying wine on the Internet, gambling offshore,
or buying medicines are simple examples.  See Phaedra Hise, Grapes of Wrap, Net vs.
Norm, FORBES ASAP, May 31, 1999, at 35 (explaining how a fledgling Internet
entrepreneur takes advantage of state laws to sell wine on the Internet); Robert Pear, Online
Sales Spur Illegal Importing of Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2000, at A1 (explaining new
problems created by Internet sales of illegally imported medicine).  There is another way to
relate globalization to this topic. It can be argued that our new-found comfort with global
commerce and finance lead to a comfort with fancy foreign trusts.  This comfort with such
trusts and the foreign jurisdictions’ easing impeding rules of common law led to our
comfort with repealing the Rule at home.
213 “Offshore” signifies what Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum calls the “unregulated
bazaar for free capital.”  Schoenblum, supra note 153, at 522.  In a sense this article is about
rich folks’ response to what General Electric calls the “three big ‘external’ shocks . . .
globalization, the move from manufacturing to services and the Internet.”  General Electric,
The House that Jack Built, supra note 99, at 25-26.
that offers no profits for industry?210
We also do not trust government because the increased information
about politics and politicians available everywhere, including the Internet,
leaves the body politic with an ever-greater contempt for, and despair
about, government. People working for giant firms see those firms forming
their own private governments and utilities and are inspired to make their
own arrangements in their private lives.
Part of our lost faith in government comes from the fact that we live
in a global economy. The global economy seems to be one where the
protection of a (perpetual) trust, offshore if necessary, is especially nice.
National governments are losing their powers to control the global
economy.211  The need for protection through money is intensified.  It is
becoming a Dutch world of international trading with land not being the
center of the economy and with the global view of the world being the
triumphant view.  Globalization and the Internet create more opportunities
to cheat212 and undermine state and national government, which provides
another excuse as to why it is necessary to cheat.  Additionally, creating a
trust offshore is very easy.213
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214 Professor Cherlin tells us that in Fall 1999, “only 35% [of those surveyed] say that
most people can be trusted.”  See Cherlin, supra note 89, at 3.  As Professor Ullmann states,
“One of the striking things is the absence of a feeling of common endeavor.  Everyone
seems to be out for himself [sic].”  Richard Ullmann, The US and the World: An Interview
with George Kennan, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 12, 1999, at 4.
215 See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547 (1964).
216 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE HORIZONTAL SOCIETY (1999).
217 See id.
218 Pity the man with only $12 million.  See Dobris, supra note 52, at 561 n.81; Dobris,
supra note 14, at 255.  See also Benjamin M. Friedman, The Power of the Electronic Herd,
N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, July 15, 1999, at 40 (reviewing THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS
AND THE OLIVE TREE (1999)).
219 See Alexander, supra note 96, at 1193.
All of this occurs at a time when we seem to have lost faith and
interest in a civil, communitarian society and in the rejuvenation of public
life.  “Every boat on its own bottom” is the motto in today’s world.214 
People want and feel they need more protection.  The protective and
dynastic functions of trusts that Lawrence Friedman215 saw as essentially
separate in 1964 appear to be converging.  The world looks sufficiently
dangerous that settlors do not want simply to protect the known weak and
the sick in their families.   They want to protect everybody.  Interestingly,
in a book review,216 Friedman describes the danger the new economy and
the new flattening of hierarchies presents for people of privilege.
Previously, they might have passed on a place in the hierarchy to their
children.  Today they cannot.217 
People are money-hungry because expectations are higher, things
cost more, and being a garden-variety millionaire is not of great use.218
So, to conclude this subsection, at the fin de millennium, it is useful
to repeat that we look at a world of people over-interested in money.
B. Trust Law Gets Reformed in Changing Times
Professor Gregory Alexander has convincingly stated that social and
economic changes and capital formation often lead to changes in trust
law.219  These are such times.  So, it is not unusual to find that there are
changes in trust law occurring.  The ground is fertile.  Arguably, the
general process of changing trust law has been underway since the mid-
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220 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, supra note 110; UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR
ACT, supra note 110; Langbein, supra note 110.  The latest is the Uniform Trust Code,
formerly called the Uniform Trust Act, adopted on August 3, 2000, by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law. See
 www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uta/trust1009.htm (last visited Feb 9, 2001).
221 See Dobris, supra note 50.  The only difference is that the reforms of the 1980s and
early 1990s were, for better or worse, in the hands of the professors and the Grandees of the
Probate Reform Establishment.  These Rule Against Perpetuities and asset protection trust
changes are in the hands of others who are arguably leading a race to the bottom.  See Sterk,
supra note 4.  Even England plans a loosened Rule of 125 years.  See THE LAW
COMMISSION THIRTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 1998: MODERN LAW FOR MODERN NEEDS 36
(Law Com. No. 298).  The number 125 also was suggested by Professor Paul Haskell in A
Proposal for a Simple and Socially Effective Rule Against Perpetuities, 66 N.C. L. REV. 545
(1988).  Perhaps 250 years is long enough to make people give up on perpetual trusts.  The
author hopes to explore these issues in a forthcoming essay.
222 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 15, at 81-86.  Thurow, supra note 54, at 63.
223 As Joyce Carol Oates states in another context,  it “must have to do with fin-de-
siecle anxiety about the imminent century and its vistas shrouded in mist, a longing for the
. . . past . . . in the midst of our continuous, exhausting technological revolution.  As the
actual lived lives of most Americans become ever more complex and fractured and, in a
sense, more generic and impersonal, we yearn for . . . .”  Joyce Carol Oates, Wearing Out
the West, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 21, 1999, at 30, 32 (reviewing KENT HARUF, PLAINSONG
(1999)).
224 The dynasty trust is defined and discussed many places.  See DUKEMINIER & KRIER,
supra note 50, at 316; Dobris, supra note 50, at 572 n.135; Layman, supra note 29.
225 See Dobris, supra note 50.
1980s.220  We are now getting around to fiddling with the Rule and with
spendthrift trust doctrine.221  Capitalism is the process of creative
destruction.222  This social uncertainty223 intensifies and perhaps justifies
the desire for the family protection offered by a trust.  In a time of chaotic
change everyone wants a little safeguard.  And everyone understands that
desire.  It is a sensible thing to do, like putting your money in your shoe in
a tough neighborhood.  As a sensible thing to do, it attracts a certain
amount of sympathy.
C. The “Dynasty Trust” Craze Feeds the Frenzy
The idea that people need perpetual trusts is fed by, among other
things, the estate planning industry, the productization of trusts, and the
specific peddling of dynasty trusts.224
Clearly, estate planning has become an industry.225  This has come
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226 See id. 
227 See id.  How long the transfer tax will last is another question.  See Joel C. Dobris,
A Brief  for the Abolition of All Transfer Taxes, 35 SYR. L. REV. 1215 (1984).  
228 Dynasty trust planning is discussed in Dukeminier, supra note 47; Pierce H.
McDowell, III, The Dynasty Trust: Protective Armor for Generations to Come, TR. & EST.,
Oct. 1993, at 47.  A similar term was used in Friedman, supra note 215.
229 The Section 2631 generation-skipping transfer tax exemption is $1,030,000 in the
year 2000. The figure is increased for inflation.  See I.R.C. § 2631(c).
230 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 50, at 316-19; Dukeminier, supra note 47.
That the dynasty trust is a product is shown by the diction in Citi Private Trust Services: A
New & Enhanced Offering, TR. & EST., Aug. 1999, at S11.  It is open to argument whether
the tax-favored dynasty trust leads to more savings or just to the transfer of assets already
saved to the trust.  The possibility that preferred treatment for long-term trusts might lead
to additional savings is discussed in French, supra note 4, at 349.
about for several reasons, including the pressure on lawyers in firms to
produce more income, the inclusion in the estate planning process of
business people as well as learned professionals, and the increase in the
stakes caused by the passing of enormous sums from the Depression
Generation to the Baby Boomer Generation.226
Also, trusts clearly have become products in the new world of estate
planning.  “Trustification” and “productization” are with us, at least as long
as there are federal transfer taxes and advantages under those systems for
using trusts.227  The trust as a product goes hand in hand with the industrial-
ization, or commercialization, of estate planning.
The product of special interest in this Article is the so-called dynasty
trust.228  Simply stated, a dynasty trust is a trust of a little more than $1
million229 that is designed to take full advantage of the exceptions to and
exemptions from the gift, estate, and generation-skipping transfer taxes.230
Dynasty trusts often are made creditor-proof.  After the year 2006, an
unmarried person in some states will be able to place $1 million into a trust
that can exist in  perpetuity, supporting a dynasty, to the extent of trust
income, without any transfer taxes ever being paid.  In theory, only income
taxes will be collected.  This is “hot planning” and is easy to sell. 
Thus, freedom from the Rule Against Perpetuities is being merchan-
dized along with other trust “products.”  People interested in buying a trust
learn about perpetual trusts, and many seemingly come to want one.  It
seems like a sensible way to leverage a million dollars (or two, if people
are married)—to put an anchor windward for the family.  If the settlor has
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231 Consistent with the consumer imagery in the text, these trusts also have become
items of conspicuous consumption, like Rolex watches.  They are what are called
“positional goods.”  See The 20th Century, supra note 15, at 11.
232 See Count on Compound Interest, at
http://www.aarp.org/confacts/money/compinterest.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2000).
233 Tax-efficient investing involves taking tax effects into account in making
investment decisions.  See Robert H. Jeffrey & Robert D. Arnott, Is Your Alpha Big Enough
to Cover Its Taxes?, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Spring 1993, at 15. IRA compounding is
discussed in Virginia Munger Kahn, In Estate Planning, A Roth I.R.A. Shines, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 1998, § 3, at 7. Professor Bruce A. Wolk has prepared an illustration showing how
$1 million  before taxes, put in an IRA at age 70, can grow to $11 million after taxes, under
the right circumstances. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 20, at 430.
234 In Summer 1998, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, one of the “Big Five” accounting
firms, was circulating a general interest newsletter suggesting that $1 million in a dynasty
trust could grow to $159 million for the benefit of the settlor’s great-great-grandchildren.
See Deloitte & Touche Review (July 20, 1998) (copy on file with author).
235 One is reminded of Spike Lee’s movie title, MO’ BETTER BLUES (Universal
Pictures 1990).
more than $20 million, then placing some of it into a special product trust
appears to be wise estate planning diversification.  Once a client is ready to
buy a trust product, the more features, the better, in terms of justifying the
decision to create the trust and the planner’s fee.  It is a bit like leather
upholstery in a new car.231
The leveraging attraction of the dynasty trust should not be
underestimated.  We are obsessed with the power of compounding. 
Einstein once stated that compound interest was humankind’s greatest
achievement.232 When compounding is combined with tax deferral by way
of tax-efficient investing,233 the lure of a fortune234 to buttress a dynasty for
“only a couple of million dollars” is strong.
D. “Everyone” W ants a Trust These Days
We are in love with trusts, and as trust lovers we want to intensify the
effect—we want more and better.235
We are trust-minded.  More people are estate-tax-conscious because
of prosperity, long-term inflation, and the passage of the trillions of dollars
from the Depression Generation to the Baby Boomer Generation.  Once
people are interested in avoiding estate taxes they become interested in
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Expectations, Entitlement and Inheritance, 24 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1 (1989).
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238 See Joel C. Dobris, Marital Deduction Estate Planning: Variations on a Classic
Theme, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 801 (1983).
239 A conversation about this Article with a retired corporate treasurer of a nonprofit
organization, who is not a rich person, led to his extolling Roth IRAs for grandchildren as
a way to keep money “working tax-free forever.”
240 See Dobris, supra note 238.
241 See William Blatt, The American Dream in Legislation: The Role of Popular
Symbols in Wealth Tax Policy, 51 TAX L. REV. 287, 350 (1996).
242 See ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 137.
trusts and more sympathetic with the truly rich.  More folks become
avoidance-minded.  Currently, when millions of Americans are waiting
hopefully for their inheritances from the Depression Generation, the idea
that inheritances and interests in estates and trusts are bad is laughable.
“More and sooner” is the basic thought.  In this era of flexible and heavily
sold trusts, few people are afraid of the trust’s interfering with enjoyment
of their money.  Of course, this can change if, and when, those trusts begin
interfering with the beneficiaries’ enjoyment of money.
Middle-class people want trusts for many purposes, including
Medicaid planning,236 ERISA planning,237 credit shelter planning,238 and
splitting assets between second wives and children of first marriages.  The
middle class also sees advantages in quasi- and pseudo-trusts such as those
in IRAs239 and Uniform Transfers to Minors Act accounts.  Trusts look
good to many people, and perpetuities are an unknown devil, if noticed at
all.  
Trusts have become good for the middle class, and the law changes
when change is good for the middle class. This insight is used by the left to
build a base for social reform for the poor,240 and by the right to build a
base for tax reform for the rich.  Social Security was sold to the middle
class as a program of insurance for everyone.241 Reducing the bite of
transfer taxes or capital gains taxes is sold as a boon to the middle class.242
Prosperity enables more people to believe that they can strike it rich.  If that
is so, why attack the wealthy?  Members of the middle class want a level
playing field for the wealthy, in case they join them someday.  The present
discounted value of their share of the estate tax, as distributed to them by
government, is less than the current value of their fantasy of success.
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243 One is reminded of the joke in the Woody Allen Movie, Annie Hall.  The man goes
to the psychiatrist and complains that his brother thinks he is a chicken.  The doctor tells
him to simply inform his brother he is not a chicken.  The man says he cannot, “because we
need the eggs.”  Vanessa Thorpe, Focus: When All the Talk Has to Stop, THE INDEPENDENT,
Jan. 3, 1999, at 16 (Features section).  People think they need the money.
244 See French, supra note 4 (discussing the possibility that long-term trusts might be
good for families).
245 See Friedman, supra note 215.
246 One might speculate, fancifully, that we are witnessing a modest, partial return to
feudalism.  We are looking at a world of weak nation-states, private armies, and baronial
leaders of large corporate entities.  A world without effective government is, in some sense,
feudalistic.  And, where one finds feudalism, one finds an interest in perpetuities.  Thoughts
of feudalism are in the air.  See DOUGLAS COPELAND, MICROSERFS (1995).
247 See Alexander, supra note 93 (citing Chancellor Kent).
248 Those legislatures seeking to repeal the Rule are arguably in a race to the bottom.
See Sterk, supra note 4.  Judges, however, do appear to genuinely care about direct and
indirect restraints on the alienation of the fee, of the property itself, and of the duration of
the restraint.  See Eagle Enter., 349 N.E.2d at 816.  And, of course, if a perpetuities
violation is brought to their attention, the judges will do their duty and void the offending
interest, but with no social concern.  It is just a case of some stupid lawyer, or settlor, who
blew the drafting.  It is a game of “gotcha,” not a question of social policy.  If the RAP
disappears, judges will end trusts as they now end equitable servitudes, with a changed
To sum up this subsection, people feel an increasing need for more
money,243 trusts in  general, and perpetual trusts in particular.  Perpetual
trusts promise the family more money through tax savings, superior
investing through aggregation of assets, reduced fractionalization of assets,
and reduced dissipation of donated assets.244
There has been a convergence of Professor Lawrence Friedman’s
trust categories of the protective and the dynastic245 in ways that are new to
us.246
IV.  NO ONE IS GUARDING THE CHICKEN COOP
Society’s and law’s guardians are asleep at the gatehouse.  It seems
reasonable to suggest that rich people will always seek advantages.247
When they obtain an advantage, one explanation is that the advantage is
theirs because the watchdogs are sleeping.  As discussed, the citizenry
seems to not care, and those who govern or who have the job of protecting
society do not seem to care, either.  Some legislatures and most lawyers, in
their public utterances, are hardly concerned about perpetuities.248
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circumstances doctrine.
249 Despite its being boring, the RAP did figure in the plot of the movie Body Heat,
which was not boring.  See BODY HEAT (Warner Brothers 1981).
250 The lack of interest in the RAP is arguably part of a general lack of interest in
anything that did not “happen” in the 20th century.  See David Bates, University History:
Undergraduate History 1999, HISTORY TODAY, Aug. 1999, at 54.
251 Of course, many distinguished modern scholars have written “recently” about
perpetuities.  At the risk of leaving out professors who deserve mentioning, the list includes:
ROGER W. ANDERSEN, UNDERSTANDING TRUSTS AND ESTATES, 277-305 (1996); Ira Mark
Bloom, Perpetuities Refinement: There is an Alternative, 62 WASH. L. REV. 23 (1987);
Jesse Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1648 (1985);
Carolyn Burgess Featheringill, Understanding the Rule Against Perpetuities: A Step-by-Step
Approach, 13 CUMB. L. REV. 161 (1983); Fellows, supra note 5; Robert L. Fletcher,
Perpetuities: Basic Clarity, Muddled Reform, 63 WASH. L. REV. 791 (1988); French, supra
note 4; Haskell, supra note 221; Amy Morris Hess, Freeing Property Owners From the
RAP Trap: Tennessee Adopts the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 62 TENN. L.
REV. 267 (1995); Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead
A. The Rule is too Technical to Sustain Interest
Most people do not understand the problem. The question is hard to
understand and too technical and boring for lawyers and laypeople alike.249
It is similar to a game of “insider baseball.”  Investigative reporters with the
skills to discuss this material and make it understandable to laypeople deal
with sexier stuff.  Their bright, non-investigative siblings are personal
finance reporters for magazines that cater to people who use trusts of this
sort.  The perception is that the RAP is hard to understand, so why not just
abolish it?
Many teachers are no better.  The teaching of the RAP is at an all-
time low.  This state of affairs is both a symptom of the lack of interest and
an explanation for it.250  In July 1999, contrary to the predictions of the bar
review courses and many professors, there was a major Rule Against
Perpetuities question on the California Bar Exam.  The howl of outrage and
pain  of the recent graduates surely reached the grave of John Chipman
Gray.  Whether he heard them or not, we cannot know.  The mutual pact
between law teachers and law students to hive off the old-fashioned and
boring bits is taking its toll.  Indirect restraints on alienation are boring.  No
one wants to teach them.  The RAP is hard to learn, and students are
customers now.  Why risk bad evaluations when teaching sexy topics is so
easy?  Many professors would say that the RAP is not a sexy research
topic, either.251
FALL 2000 The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities  657
Hand, 68 IND. L. J. 1 (1992); Ronald C. Link & Kimberly A. Licata, Perpetuities Reform in
North Carolina: The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, Nondonative Transfers
and Honorary Trusts, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1783  (1996); Robert J. Lynn, Perpetuities Literacy
for the 21st Century, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 219 (1989); S. Alan Medlin & F. Ladson Boyle, What
Every South Carolina Lawyer Should Know About the (Ugh!) Rule Against Perpetuities,
S.C. LAW., May-June 1991, at 27; Lawrence W. Waggoner, Perpetuities: A Perspective on
Wait-and-See, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1714 (1985).  A number of these articles refer to the
USRAP, the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities.  See authorities cited in note 4,
supra.
252 Paradoxically, we believe there are no aristocrats in the United States.  We are all
middle class.  We are all capitalists.  Barbers speculate.  Professors speculate.
253 Whether populism is up or down is, of course, cyclical.  See Baker, supra note 35.
254 Professor Ed Halbach has stated that “trust law in the United States is primarily a
matter of state law . . . .”  Halbach,  supra note 3, at 531.
255 See Ascher, supra note 165, at 69.
256 Professor Susan French brought this to my attention.  Every reader knows the
popular culture demonizes the IRS. 
257 “Has there ever been a time when business people had higher prestige and fewer
sworn enemies? I don’t think so.”  Brooks & Elliot, supra note 56.
B. Americans Have Lost Touch with Their Populist Roots
Our guardians are asleep because we just do not care.  We think we
like rich people and aristocrats.252  Populism is at an all-time low.253
Virtually no class war instincts remain in the United States.  Socialism is at
its ebb. Social outrage about money is at an all-time low.  Society is
unmoved by a few fire-eaters at the Treasury, in the IRS, or on some law
faculty. Many opinion-molding law professors are very prosperous and
interested in other topics.  Populists at the IRS or in the Treasury are
irrelevant because perpetuities is a matter of state law,254 and no states have
bureaus of perpetuities.  The perpetuities populists seem to be tax techies
who are accustomed to rejecting the special pleading of the rich255 and are
normally  either professors or work for the IRS or the Treasury.  People do
not like government bureaucrats or professors256 and are unlikely to be led
by them. Muckraking is at an all-time low.257
C. Society’s Commentators are too Prosperous to Go After the Rich
A partial explanation for the lack of attention paid to the RAP is the
general prosperity among the chattering classes, including the relatively
prosperous law professors. The members of the chattering classes are
moneyed and identify with the more prosperous.  Pundits are
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258 See ERIC ALTERMAN, SOUND AND FURY, THE MAKING OF THE PUNDITOCRACY
(1999).
259 See GRAY, supra note 5, at vii-ix, quoted in Alexander, supra note 93.  Gray is also
quoted in Lischer, supra note 160, at 482.
260 See Dobris, supra note 50.
261 See Sir Peregrine Worsthorne, How Western Culture was Saved by the CIA, THE
LITERARY REV., July 1999, at 16 (reviewing FRANCIS STONOR SAUNDERS, WHO PAID THE
PIPER? (1999)).
The CIA was then part of the American Establishment and, as such, run by
civilised, God-fearing Second World War heroes, mostly with private incomes,
millionaires.258  Reform-minded trust lawyers are thin on the ground in the
face of the great transfer of wealth underway from the Depression
Generation to the Baby Boomer Generation.  Society has delegated trust
law reform to the lawyers for the rich.  No puritanical voice of reform is
heard in the land.  We are blinded by gold’s glitter in this moment of
prosperity.  The rage that John Chipman Gray felt against the spendthrift
trust (first cousin, once removed, to the perpetual trust) is inconceivable
today.259 The meritocrats and technocrats who might be expected to be
unhappy about perpetuities empathize with the desire to secure and transfer
advantage to descendants and often see no harm in letting rich folks do it,
too.  People whom you might think would rail against trusts want them for
Medicaid and splitting interests between second marriage spouses and the
issue of first marriages.  No one in the audience, or with an audience, is
interested. There is no political will to upset the apple cart.
D. Perpetual Restraints are Rarely Imposed on Assets
Perpetuities criticism is on the back burner because fewer settlors
than ever want to impose them on assets (as opposed to equitable interests).
There is too much money to be made by wild investing.  The restraints are
on the equitable interests that emerge from the easily transferred assets and
that are not perceived as dangerous.
E. Trust World Standards are Eroding
Generally speaking, standards in the trust world are being diluted.
The trust professional’s sense of duty is pale these days.260  Therefore, to
the extent this is a trust matter, the watchdog is not barking.261  There is a
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beautiful wives and somewhat disturbingly progressive views (very anti Joe
McCarthy), who lived in charming Georgetown houses full of modern art and
antique furniture. . . .  Only later . . .  did standards begin to fall . . .  as . . . zealots
. . . began to replace the East-Coast gentry.
Id.  
The East-Coast gentry, for all of its many, dreary infirmities, set a certain trust
standard that often is found missing today. 
262 See Sterk, supra note 4.
263 See THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999).
264 See Halbach,  supra note 3, at 535-36.
265 See id.
266 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 555-59 (1990) (stating that seemingly mandatory rules
often can be set aside with clever lawyering).  Trust default rules are discussed in Henry
Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic
Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 447, 469 (1998).  Their discussion cites John H. Langbein,
The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 627 (1995).  When clever
lawyering is not enough, then clever legislating is in order.  The Alaska opt-in community
property system is an example of changing the law to get delicious results for the
prosperous.  See ALASKA STAT. § 34.77.060 (a) (2000).  In a sentence, often there are tax
advantages to community property and the Alaska legislature has created an optional
community property system for outsiders, just as it has modified trust law to attract trust
general breakdown in the fusty Old World of trusts in  every aspect,
including inevitably the RAP.  Legislatures are falling all over themselves
to lower trust standards to attract out-of-state trust business.  This
phenomenon is what Professor Stewart Sterk has called, in a first cousin
context, the race to the bottom.262
F. Love of Default Rules Has Changed Our View of Law’s Social Role
We are becoming accustomed to the idea that most rules involving
private arrangements are default rules.263  We have grown so used to the
law of private arrangements being changeable at the will of the parties, and
we are so taken by changeable default rules as the efficient way to order
private affairs, that we have grown short-sighted.  We do not see a social
threat in many trust arrangements short of meaningful restraints on
marriage264 or racist discrimination.265  We live in a world of default rules.
Default rules are those that control in absence of a contrary expression and
can be easily set aside.  It is beginning to seem as though almost every rule
of law can be set aside.  So what is the big deal if we allow grantors to set
aside the RAP?266 
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business.  See Jonathan Blattmachr et al., Tax Planning with Consensual Community
Property: Alaska’s New Community Property Law, 33 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 615
(1999).  See also George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated
Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161 (1977) (arguing that the estate tax is easily
avoided and thus, like to the Rule, also “voluntary”).  Common sense suggests that default
rules work well in a commercial and corporate context because the creditors can protect
themselves via contracting and charging more money to make risky loans, and the
shareholders (and creditors) can diversify their risks away.  One might say that beneficiaries
in need of protection cannot fall back on such devices.  This concern is somewhat
undermined by the idea that many of these trusts are not protective in nature, but designed
to save taxes for likely-to-be able beneficiaries.  The voluntary nature of the Rule is
captured in this quote from the leading estate planning treatise:
[Perpetuities is] a topic that fills more students of the law . . . with dread . . . but
fortunately it is very nearly a dead letter. Between reforms that have ameliorated
the harshness and a trend of various states to suspend the Rule as it applies to
interests in trust, the only issue for an estate planner today is knowing how (or
where) to create future interests that will not violate the Rule.  In virtually all
cases that is no more difficult than knowing to include an effective perpetuities
savings clause. . . . [Basically the Rule is] far less likely ever to be a concern to
efficient estate planning.
2 A. JAMES CASNER & JEFFREY N. PENNELL, ESTATE PLANNING § 11.2, at 11-32, (6th ed.
1998).  See generally Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter O. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal
Strategy, 49 DUKE L. J. 1405 (2000) (positing that good lawyering can avoid almost any
rule), cited in Frances H. Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance: A New Model from
China, WIS. L. REV. 1199, 1255 n.379 (1999).
G. Trusts Can Never Be a Problem
The current love affair with trusts means there is no reason to be on
guard against them.  It is a period of “trustification.”  The trustification of
the prosperati’s planning world leaves no room for distrust of trusts.  Not
unlike the Trojan Horse, all trusts are welcome and pass by the guards with
ease.  We are in a moment in time when people love trusts.  No one seems
to wonder if this loveable thing—the trust—works, partly because there has
always been a Rule Against Perpetuities.  Rather, folks seem to want more
of a good thing—a double dose; if a prescription of two pills is good for
me, imagine what four will do.  If 100-year trusts work so well, how about
200- or 500-year versions?
H. Law Reform Mantras are Being Misappropriated
The current law reform shibboleths confuse the issue.  Clarity and
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267 Professor Jeffrey Evans Stake points out that the direction of perpetuities reform is
to reduce the Rule’s application.  See Jeffrey Evans Stake, Inheritance Law, 2 NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECON. & L. 311 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).  The ultimate form
of reduction is, obviously, repeal. 
268 See Fellows, supra note 5, at 605 n.25 (noting the potential for misappropriating
clarity’s clarion call).
269 See Jesse Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1867,
1907 (1986).
270 The author hopes to explore this topic in a future article.
271 See Joel C. Dobris, A Brief, supra note 227 (arguing that the estate tax exists to
keep rich folks “on their toes”).
efficiency are the watchwords of trust law reform.267  Abolishing the RAP
is clear and in some ways efficient.  Abolishing a complicated rule looks
like a wholesome part of the probate law reform landscape.  The RAP is a
hard rule for lawyers to deal with, so let us undo it.268  Why suffer?
Professor Jesse Dukeminier forecast that the rise of successful malpractice
claims against lawyers would cause the rules that trip up lawyers,
especially the RAP, to be simplified or dropped.269  His prediction is
coming true.  Love of clarity is the order of the day for sincere law
reformers.  Nothing is clearer than no rule at all.  Clients are sick of
“mumbo jumbo”; therefore, clarity rules the day.  Those who would race to
the bottom are misappropriating the reformers’ baton—love of clarity.  A
parallel universe of trust law reform exists to advantage the wealthy.  In
that universe, the intellectual traditions of the trust world are not
important.270
More specifically, there has been much interest over the last few
decades in reforming the Rule in a more traditional fashion, to clarify it and
make it less daunting and less responsive to social concerns of yesteryear.
This willingness to trim and tailor the Rule arguably has been misappropri-
ated in pursuit of repeal.  
I. Our Tools for Disciplining the Rich Have Changed
Since we apparently have lost interest in  the historically primary
social purposes of the Rule—to avoid dead hand control and to avoid the
buttressing of aristocracies—then the only justification that remains is the
social and cultural goal of keeping rich folks off balance.271  However, our
hearts are not in it.  Moreover, it may be that we have switched to direct
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272 See ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 137.
273 See Lacey & Schmitt, supra note 74.
274 Management guru Peter Drucker would cheer on those who attack high
management paychecks.  See Fred Andrews, The Sage of Value and Service: At 90, Drucker
Still Preaches Customers Over Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1999, at C1.  Drucker’s latest
book is MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1999).
275 See A Survey of Pay: The Best . . . and the Rest, THE ECONOMIST, May 8, 1999, at
57.
276 See Cooper, supra note 266.
277 “Has there ever been a time when business people had higher prestige and fewer
sworn enemies? I don’t think so.”  Brooks & Elliot, supra note 56.
278 For a discussion of the modern public relations industry, see MARCHAND, supra
note 69.  For a discussion of cultural constructs in the estate taxation of the rich, see Blatt,
supra note 69, at 225.
attacks on a few rich scapegoats like those made on Michael Milken272 and
Bill Gates,273 combined with a few toothless nips at the ankles of overcom-
pensated corporate executives.274  We show sporadic anger at managers’
high earnings275 but do not seem concerned about big pools of capital.  A
tempting label for this trend is a neurotic perversion of the guardian
instinct.  One is reminded of the almost inconsequential and easily
avoidable estate tax.276  We seem to be in the business of inflicting the most
modest of harms on rich folks, but only on the rich who are unlucky or
unwise.277  Why we are content to attack only a few rich guys, and then in
a desultory fashion, is ultimately outside the scope of this Article.
However, a worthwhile question is whether we have been tricked into
loving rich people by public relations.278  Have we been tricked into taking
out our anger against the rich with a few foolish feints against Michael
Milken and Bill Gates?  Or, are our muckraking, populist, socialist, and
antimaterialist ideas simply in hibernation because of prosperity?
To conclude this subsection, the guardians of society are asleep at the
gatehouse.  Anti-rich, anti-aggregation, anti-aristocratic reformers are thin
on the ground and not interested in RAP reform.  Popular opposition will
not be based on a true understanding of perpetuities.  It will be based on
outrage towards rich people.  These days, we do not hate rich people and
do not fear aristocracies or aggregations of wealth. 
V.  THE FUTURE
As Yogi Berra is reported to have said, “The future ain’t what it used
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279 Chris Moran, Soothsayers 1999, 2000: Readers Offer Versions of What the Future
Might Be, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Jan. 2, 2000, at B1. The author hopes to make a
number of predictions in a future article.
280 In addition to offshore jurisdictions, Alaska and Delaware have repealed the Rule.
See, e.g., Douglas J. Blattmachr & Richard W. Hompesch, II, Alaska v. Delaware:
Heavyweight Competition in New Trust Laws, PROB. & PROP., Jan./Feb. 1998, at 32.
Repeal in a minority of jurisdictions can be quite meaningful.  Professor Edward Halbach
wrote in a different context, “[O]ne should not underestimate the business protection or
attraction incentives and lobbying effectiveness of bankers associations . . . .”  Halbach,
supra note 3, at 543.  If bankers want the repeal they likely will get it.  Two obvious ways
to attack the use of these wild trusts is to end the tax benefits or criminalize their use and
any participation in their use.  The attempt to criminalize involvement with Medicaid asset
planning trusts went nowhere in the 1990s.  See Dobris, supra note 236.  The terms of the
Alaska and Delaware Acts are discussed in Jeffrey N. Pennell, Recent Wealth Transfer Tax
Developments, SC75 A.L.I.–A.B.A. 193, 221-23 (1998).  The author believes that if federal
transfer taxes are repealed, then there will be more changes in trust law to make trusts more
attractive.  This likely will happen to make up for lost revenue when trusts to save taxes
lose meaning.  The result may be that more states will repeal the Rule than otherwise might
have.
281 The point is simple.  Income in excess of 3% eventually will so greatly erode the
principal that the trustee will not end the trust, nor will any of the beneficiaries or a judge
with jurisdiction.  If the trust survives, the amount involved will not support much of a
barony.  As to the 3% point, see Dobris, supra note 14; Garland, supra note 10; Roger
Hertog and David A. Levine, Income versus Wealth: Making the Trade-Off, J. INVESTING,
Spring 1996, at 5.  Erosion will be accelerated in some cases by beneficiary demands for
excess return.  Of course, it is possible that trustees wanting to keep their commissions in
to be.”279  There are several predictions to make.  How many states will
repeal the Rule?  How many settlors will create perpetual trusts?  What
effect will a world without the Rule have on society?  What will happen if
there is no RAP in the modern world?  Nothing?  Something awful?  
For better or worse, the apparent answers are that only a minority of
states will repeal the Rule,280 only a minority of rich testators will create
perpetual trusts, and nothing terrible will happen socially.  If dramatic
abuse of the repeal occurs, some ham-handed reform surely will follow.
Every large state will have one pesky law professor who will testify,
perhaps successfully, against a total repeal.  Inertia, the drama of establish-
ing a perpetual trust, and the low present value of saving estate taxes for
one’s great, great, great,  great, great-grandchildren, will keep down the
number of perpetual trusts created.  Those trusts created will cause little
social harm for a variety of reasons, including: erosion through invasion of
principal, excess production of income,281 and the lack of restraints on the
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perpetuity may resist termination.  Professor David Hayton correctly points out that trustees
often will properly tilt their administration toward a needy or beloved beneficiary.  See
David Hayton, English Fiduciary Standards and Trust Law, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
555, 561 (1999).  One wonders if tilting is still appropriate conduct if the trust is perpetual
(probably) and if it will cease once the persons who are benefited by the trust who were
known to the settlor die (possibly). 
282 See R. Zebulon Law et al., The Rule Against Perpetuities: An Update, 24 TAX
MGMT, EST., GIFTS & TR. J. 222 (1999). 
283 In June 2000, the House passed a bill abolishing the estate tax and sent it to the
Senate.  See H.R. 8, 106th Cong. (2000).  President Clinton followed through with his threat
to veto the measure on August 31, 2000.  See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d106:HR00008:@@@x (last visited Oct. 10, 2000).  The willingness to do
this provides more proof of our comfort with dynasties. The author thanks Professor Bruce
Wolk for this point.  If transfer taxes are repealed it is likely that legislated trust law
gimmickry will increase as part of an attempt to save trust bankers’ business.  The effort to
repeal transfer taxes continues. 
284 See Dobris, supra note 50; Francis S. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property
in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691 (1938).
285 CHATWIN, supra note 83, at 83.  Chatwin goes on to say, “Wealth was divorced
from its sources.  A strong state . . . collapsed under the strain.”  Id.
alienation of the trust principal.
The government likely will deny trust benefits to trusts that last for
more than a certain number of years and has considered using the number
90.282  Perhaps a larger number like 125, 200, or 250 would be useful.  The
lesser possibility exists that Congress will abolish transfer taxes.283 
VI.  CONCLUSION
Explanations for the present-day erosion of the RAP include: (1) the
harm from perpetuities (real or perceived) has lessened; (2) the need for
perpetuities (real or perceived) has become greater; and (3) the guardians
of society, whose duty it is to sound the alarm against perpetuities, are
asleep at the switch.
Not many people seem to fret about tax havens.  Few seem to feel
that wealth carries responsibility to society along with it.  There is too little
integration these days of wealth  and duty.284  The rich have “abdicated the
responsibilities of their wealth.”285   Many of us do not even consider the
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286 However, there is a movement afoot to try and convince cyber-millionaires to
become charitable donors.  Bill Gates is making donations.  See Lock and Key, supra note
75.  Ex-Stanford Professor James H. Clark, a founder of Silicon Graphics and Netscape, has
given $150 million to Stanford.  See John Markoff, Former Professor Gives Stanford $150
Million, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1999, at A16.  Charitable donations by technology multi-
millionaires is discussed in Charles Piller, Tech’s Inventive Elite Can Reinvent Philan-
thropy, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1999, at C1.
287 See Alexander, supra note 93.  As Professor John Langbein has stated, “[T]he trust
has endured because it has changed function.”  Langbein, supra note 266, at 637.  For a
discussion of the effect of change in a trust context, see Dobris, supra note 50, at 544.
issue of responsibility of wealth these days.286
Today’s settlors have the perception that perpetual trusts are good
and few disagree.  There is a disconnect between the small population of
professionals and populists who abhor perpetuities and the general
population.  This separation will make the Rule Against Perpetuities
essentially unenforceable.  
We are so accustomed to perpetuities that we do not distinguish
between allowing them to exist and allowing them to be subjected to dead
hand control.  This apathy may exist because only since the 19th century
has there been a meaningful uncoupling of allowing a perpetuity to exist
and allowing dead hand control of property. The acceptance of perpetual
corporate organizations and charitable trusts has transferred over to family
trusts as we enter the 21st century.
When it comes to changing trust law for families, sentimentality and
flexibility create fertile ground for changing the law.287  Repealing the Rule
Against Perpetuities is likely to be tolerated. 
